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ABSTRACT 
In recent decades, the eyes of the world have been trained on China’s 
remarkable feats of rapid economic development. Yet the enormous 
environmental toll associated with China’s growth has also drawn global 
attention, as Chinese air and water quality plummet to historic lows. Epic 
levels of environmental degradation have fueled a growing domestic 
consensus that China must do better at reconciling these competing goals.  
This article reviews the contemporary challenges facing the second wave of 
environmental governance in China (with an addendum addressing 
important environmental law amendments enacted as it went to press). 
In the first wave of environmental governance, the government 
promulgated a series of environmental statutes that seem comprehensive—
at least on paper. Nevertheless, it has become an article of faith among 
observers that they are superficially designed and too often unrealized for 
lack of meaningful implementation. Many environmental law and policy 
directives are crafted in aspirational form, and even those that do contain 
enforceable provisions are too often obstructed, for reasons both political 
and economic. When political patronage and economic interests take 
precedence over the faithful implementation of these laws, environmental 
protection suffers alongside other fundamental goals of good governance. 
For Chinese environmental law to succeed at its increasingly urgent 
objectives, it must become more than an elaborate paper tiger, moving 
from the present era of exhortation toward a more mature era of consistent 
implementation and enforcement. However change unfolds, China will 
have to wrestle with three basic challenges that continue to obstruct 
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enforcement efforts: (1) effective pollution source management, (2) faithful 
local implementation of national environmental policies, and (3) reliable 
judicial access by the victims of environmental harm. This article considers 
these three distinct hurdles and their implications for the relationship 
between environmental governance and broader rule-of-law challenges in 
China.  
Part I reviews environmental enforcement lapses against polluters 
and the resulting groundswell of public frustration over health and safety.  
Part II explores the frequently broken link in the enforcement chain that 
occurs between central policymaking and local implementation. Part III 
reviews routine failures by the judicial system to provide redress for the 
victims of environmental harm and deterrence against future wrongdoing. 
Part IV considers environmental enforcement problems as a subcategory of 
more generalized failures of the rule of law in China. Part V concludes 
with a modest but concrete suggestion for advancing rule-of-law objectives 
through judicial reform that would materially benefit environmental 
governance. The proposal would facilitate greater judicial access and 
accountability, without imposing a fully Westernized model or triggering 
the massive political upheaval that most Chinese fear. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent decades, the eyes of the world have been trained on China’s 
remarkable feats of rapid economic development. Yet the enormous 
environmental toll associated with China’s growth has also drawn global 
attention, as Chinese air and water quality plummet to historic lows.1 Epic 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Tseming Yang, Introduction, Snapshot of the State of China’s Environmental 
Regulatory System, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 145 (2007) (“[O]nly in recent years has the serious impact 
of pollution and environmental degradation on China itself become visible to the rest of the world. 
Nowadays, China is oftentimes pointed to as the nation with the world's worst urban air pollution 
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levels of environmental degradation have fueled a growing domestic 
consensus that China must do better at reconciling these competing goals.2 
Environmental consciousness is gathering force among the public, 
reflecting both despair over current conditions and hope for a better future. 
Still, government leaders struggling to correct course have confronted 
sobering obstacles to environmental reform, many related to broader rule-
of-law challenges for Chinese governance more generally. With special 
attention to these issues, this article reviews the contemporary challenges 
facing the second wave of environmental governance in China. 
 In the first wave of environmental governance, the government 
promulgated a series of environmental statutes that seem comprehensive—
at least on paper.3 In 1989, China enacted the basic Environmental 
Protection Law,4 which authorizes the establishment of local and national 
environmental standards,5 requires permits for the discharge of pollutants 
and ongoing environmental monitoring and impact assessment,6 creates 
civil and criminal penalties for violations,7 and generally adopts the 
“polluter pays” principle.8 The Environmental Protection Law is now 
 
problems, including the highest levels of sulfur dioxide emissions, severe water pollution issues, and 
serious problems of agricultural soil contamination.”).   
 2.  See, e.g., Jennifer Duggan, China’s Environmental Problems are Grim, Admits Ministry 
Report, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 7:19 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/chinas-
choice/2013/jun/07/chinas-environmental-problems-grim-ministry-report (noting that Chinese officials 
are balancing environmental protection with economic growth); Wang Yiqing, Steps Forward, and a 
Step Back, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 16, 2013, 8:16 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-
08/16/content_16898274.htm (noting the sharp deterioration of China’s environment  over the past two 
decades). 
 3.  See generally William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, Limits of the Law in Addressing China's 
Environmental Dilemma, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125 (1997) (describing and critiquing China’s early 
efforts in environmental law); Wang Canfa, Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current 
Deficiencies and Suggested Reforms, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 159, 184–93, 164–69 (2007) (providing a full 
review of the progress of environmental law in China and identifying failed enforcement as the 
principle systemic flaw). See also Guizhen He, Lei Zhang, Arthur P. Mol, Yonglong Lu & Jiango Liu, 
Revising China’s Environmental Law, SCIENCE, July 12, 2013, at 133 (critiquing China’s environmental 
legal system for failures in implementation and enforcement).  
 4.  Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989) 1987–1989 P.R.C. 
LAWS 337, 337 (China). 
 5.  Id. ch.II (“Supervision and Management of the Environment”). 
 6.  Id. ch. II, arts. 11 & 14 (monitoring and inspections), 13 (impact assessment), & 10 
(discharged pollutants). 
 7.  Id. ch. V (“Legal Liability”), arts. 35, 38, 39, 43, & 45. 
 8.  Id. ch. IV (“Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution and Other Public Hazards”), 
arts. 28 & 29; Id. ch. V (“Legal Liability”), arts. 41 & 44 (describing the “polluter pays” principle as 
making the emitter of pollution responsible for remediating any harms resulting from that pollution); 
see generally Grantham Res. Inst. & Duncan Clark, What is the ‘Polluter Pays’ Principle?, GUARDIAN 
(July 2, 2012, 8:34 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jul/02/polluter-pays-climate-
change  (defining the “polluter pays” principle as “the commonly accepted practice that those who 
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flanked by a series of more specific environmental statutes,9 including laws 
that address air pollution,10 water pollution,11 solid waste,12 soil and water 
conservation,13 urban planning,14 the protection of various natural 
resources,15 and the Circular (or “‘Recycling”‘) Economy Law, which 
exhorts all sectors of society to adopt sustainable practices such as 
recycling, conservation, and the restricted use of hazardous materials in 
production processes.16 China has also embraced important environmental 
goals in the two most recent Five Year Plans, the comprehensive 
statements of public policy than can assume even greater importance than 
statutory laws.17 
Despite this elaborate mosaic of environmental regulation, the Chinese 
are enduring increasingly daunting environmental and public health 
challenges. China recorded some of the worst air quality days in history,18 
 
produce pollution should bear the costs of managing it to prevent damage to human health or the 
environment”).   
 9.  See generally Environment, CHINA.ORG, http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/ 
34152.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2013) (listing all of China’s environmental laws). 
 10.  Da Qi Wu Ran Fang Zhi Fa [Law on Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 15, 1987, revised Aug. 29, 1995 and 
Apr. 29, 2000, effective Sept. 1, 2000) 2000 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz. 3 (P.R.C.).  
 11.  Shui Wu Ran Fang Zhi Fa [Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution] (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 11, 1984, revised May 15, 1996 and Feb. 28, 2008, 
effective June 1, 2008) 2008 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz. 2(268) (P.R.C.).  
 12.  Gu Ti Fei Wu Wu Ran Huan Jing Fang Zhi Fa [Law on Prevention and Control of Solid 
Waste Pollution] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 30, 1995, revised 
Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005) 2005 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz. 1(245) 
(P.R.C.). 
 13.  Law of the People’s Republic of China on Water and Soil Conservation (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 1991, effective June 29, 1991) 1990–1992 P.R.C. 
LAWS 279, 279.  
 14.  City Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Apr. 1, 1990) 1987–1989 P.R.C. LAWS 349, 349 (China). 
 15.  Specific laws have also been enacted to regulate forests, grasslands, coastal resources, 
agriculture, and others. English translations are available at CHINA.ORG, supra note 9. 
 16.  Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Xun Huan Jing Ji Cu Jin Fa [The Circular Economy 
Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2008, effective Jan. 1, 2009), translated in Circular Economy Promotion Law, 
LAW INFO CHINA, http://www.amcham-shanghai.org/NR/rdonlyres/4447E575-58FD-4D8E-BB0F-
65B920770D F7/7987/CircularEconomyLawEnglish.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). See generally 
UNITED NATIONS ENVTL. PROGRAMME, CIRCULAR ECONOMY IN CHINA: AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2006), available at http://www.unep.org/resourceefficiency/Portals/ 
24147/scp/nap/circular/pdf/prodev-summary.pdf; Charlie McElwee, China Adopts Circular Economy 
Law, CHINA ENVTL. L. BLOG (Aug. 30, 2008),  http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/ 
2008/08/30/china-adopts-circular-economy-law/. 
 17.  See infra notes 100–106 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the Five Year Plans 
and other non-statutory sources in Chinese governance) and notes 112–114 and accompanying text 
(discussing new environmental awareness evident in the Eleventh and Twelfth Five Year Plans). 
 18.  See, e.g., Louisa Lim, Beijing’s ‘Airpocalypse’ Spurs Pollution Controls, Public Pressure, 
Ryan - Final (Do Not Delete) 7/21/2014  4:29 PM 
188 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIV:183 
culminating in the so-called “Airpocalypse” of January 2013,19 when the 
air quality index reached a record high of 755—thirty times higher than the 
safety levels established by the World Health Organization.  Immersed in 
air so densely polluted that aircraft were grounded and public 
transportation halted for lack of visibility, thousands of Beijing children 
were hospitalized for respiratory issues.20 Less than two months later, 
16,000 dead pigs from factory farms were discovered decaying in the 
Huangpu River that provides drinking water for the City of Shanghai.21 
Chinese parents remain fearful of domestically produced milk products 
after a 2008 scandal in which chemical contaminants sickened hundreds of 
thousands of children and killed several infants.22 The increasing frequency 
of news items like these demonstrate that while China’s environmental 
laws may look good on paper, they have proven little more than a paper 
tiger when it comes to the lived experience of its people. 
What explains the disjuncture between China’s seemingly ambitious 
environmental governance and the reality of environmental experience in 
China? The issues are complex, and outside observers must be cautious 
with oversimplifying analyses. Part of the problem involves the ongoing 
 
NPR MORNING EDITION (Jan. 14, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/01/14/ 
169305324/beijings-air-quality-reaches-hazardous-levels. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Cf. Jonathan Kaiman, Chinese Struggle Through ‘Airpocalypse’ Smog, GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 
2013, 2:47 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/16/chinese-struggle-through-
airpocalypse-smog (reporting on one hospital in Beijing that treated 900 children for respiratory issues 
that day). Air quality crises have continued to seize northern China since then, including the emergency 
measures required in Harbin in October 2013, which included school closures, aircraft grounding, bus 
suspensions, and police interventions to prevent further pollution from car tailpipes and farmers burning 
cornstalks left from the autumn harvest. See Edward Wong, Response to a City’s Smog Points to a 
Change in Chinese Attitude, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2013, at A12. 
 21.  Nicola Davison, Rivers of Blood: The Dead Pigs Rotting in China’s Water Supply, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2013, 12:09 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/29/dead-pigs-
china-water-supply.  
 22.  In the so-called “Milk Scandal” of 2008, producers laced milk powder with a chemical that 
boosts its apparent protein content but causes kidney damage, especially in the young. Peter Foster, Top 
Ten Chinese Food Scandals, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 27, 2011, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8476080/Top-10-Chinese-Food-Scandals.html 
(noting that six babies died and 300,000 others were sickened during the milk scandal, and reporting on 
other food-safety related scandals in China); Alfred Wilhelm Meier, Baby Milk ‘Traffickers’ Supply 
China, CHINA DAILY MAIL (Apr. 13, 2013), http://chinadailymail.com/2013/04/13/baby-milk-
traffickers-supply-china/ (describing the milk scandal and its aftermath in detail). China is currently 
cracking down on the ferociously profitable trafficking of imported baby formula, after demand among 
Chinese consumers became so intense that it caused shortages in Europe and Australia. See Meier, 
supra (“Blamed for empty shop shelves from Europe to Australia, networks of baby formula traffickers 
are shipping milk powder to Chinese parents fearful of local products, and working ever harder to meet 
demand.”). See also Jason Czarnezki, Yanmei Lin & Cameron Field, Global Environmental Law: Food 
Safety in China, GEORGETOWN INT’L ENVT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (describing food safety issues 
more generally).  
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cultural shifts required to make environmental regulation effective and 
sustainable practices the norm—a shift that began earlier in the West, but 
with which Western nations like the United States are also still struggling.23 
Traditions of environmental stewardship are resurfacing in China, but it is 
still commonplace to offload private waste into public commons.24 The 
Circular Economy Law and other sustainability initiatives were designed to 
seed greater cultural appreciation for environmental values, from which 
more faithful environmental compliance will one day flow.25  Legal and 
cultural norms form a recursive dialectic in which each exerts force on the 
other, but many public attitudes have yet to catch up with the normative 
premises of China’s environmental laws.   
Nevertheless, other parts of the problem are simpler to articulate. 
While cognizant of the philosophical dimension, this article focuses on 
those aspects of the disjuncture that have less to do with philosophy and 
more to do with action—or more precisely, the regrettable lack thereof 
when it comes to environmental enforcement.  
China’s environmental law and policy targets seem ambitious on the 
surface, but it has become an article of faith among observers that they are 
superficially designed and too often unrealized for lack of meaningful 
implementation.26 The Circular Economy Law, for example, is largely 
 
 23.  See Erin Ryan, China Environmental Experiences #6: Environmental Philosophy and Human 
Relationships with Nature, ENVTL. L. PROFS BLOG (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2012/09/china-environmental-experiences-6-
environmental-philosophy-and-human-relationships-with-nature.html; Erin Ryan, China Environmental 
Experiences #7: Environmental Philosophy - Conservation, Stewardship, and Scarcity, ENVTL. L. 
PROFS BLOG (Nov. 8, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2012/11/china-
environmental-experiences-7-environmental-philosophy-conservation-stewardship-and-scarcity.html; 
Erin Ryan, China Environmental Experiences #8: Environmental Protection as an Act of Cultural 
Change, ENVTL. L. PROFS BLOG (Dec. 18, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law 
/2012/12/china-environmental-experiences-8-environmental-protection-as-an-act-of-cultural-
change.html (reflecting on the different cultural foundations for environmental governance in the East 
and West); Erin Ryan, Breathing Air with Heft: Environmental Regulation and Public Health in Urban 
China (forthcoming 2014) (same). See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Few Words on Law and the 
Environment in China, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 367 (2005) (discussing the cultural roots of 
environmental enforcement issues in China). 
 24.  See Erin Ryan, China Environmental Experiences #7: Environmental Philosophy – 
Conservation, Stewardship, and Scarcity, supra note 23 (discussing differences in Eastern and Western 
traditions of environmental stewardship). 
 25.   In support of these efforts, official signs have been posted in prominent public places to 
remind the public that “Environmental Protection is Everyone’s Responsibility.”  See id (photo of Sign 
in City of Qingdao, Shandong Province). However, some environmental critics are skeptical of the 
government’s motive in posting such signs, suggesting that they are intended more to court favor with 
global audiences than to effect a genuine change in domestic attitudes.  Oral communications with 
author by Chinese acquaintances, September 2011 (names withheld for their protection). 
 26.  See, e.g., Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 159 (“The primary problem with Chinese 
environmental law is enforcement.”); Alex L. Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in 
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exhortatory and contains few enforceable provisions.27 The Energy 
Conservation Law, which has yet to yield satisfying results, has also been 
critiqued as more of a policy statement than an operational legal device.28 
The Solid Waste Pollution Law adopted in 1995 still lacked implementing 
regulations twelve years later.29 Meanwhile, officials responsible for 
implementing the Five Year Plans have routinely ignored environmental 
targets, although new efforts to hold government officials accountable to 
these targets are a positive step.30 
Even environmental laws that do contain enforceable provisions are 
too often ignored, for both political and economic reasons.31 Sometimes 
enforcement failures reflect larger rule-of-law problems in China, such as 
the corruption and political patronage that enables some enforcement 
targets to evade compliance through financial or political ties to powerful 
officials.  Other enforcement failures reflect the math of the marketplace, as 
government officials prioritize economic development over environmental 
externalities.32 In China, as elsewhere, regulations that target activity seen 
 
China: Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 202–03 (observing that “[i]t is now generally 
accepted that China’s environmental laws are relatively complete and that enforcement is the real 
problem,” while arguing that there still remains room for substantive improvement in these laws); 
Christine J. Lee, Comment, Pollute First, Control Later No More: Combating Environmental 
Degradation in China Through an Approach Based in Public Interest Litigation and Public 
Participation, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 795, 799–809 (2008) (observing that China’s environmental 
laws are comprehensive but implementation and enforcement is lacking). 
 27.  Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Xun Huan Jing Ji Cu Jin Fa [The Circular Economy 
Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2008, effective Jan. 1, 2009), translated in Circular Economy Promotion Law, 
LAW INFO CHINA, http://www.amcham-shanghai.org/NR/rdonlyres/4447E575-58FD-4D8E-BB0F-
65B920770D F7/7987/CircularEconomyLawEnglish.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (setting forth 
sustainable practices that the state will exhort private actors to undertake). See also Alford & Shen, 
supra note 3, at 134–35 (critiquing Chinese environmental law for failing to match exhortation with 
enforceable mandates). 
 28.  Wang Mingyuin, Issues Related to the Implementation of China’s Energy Law, 8 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 225, 231 (2007) (“Generally speaking, the Energy Conservation Law is only a policy 
statement and a policy framework law; it is hardly operative.”). 
 29.  See Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 171. 
 30.  Alex L. Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy 
in China, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 368 (2013) (describing efforts following the Eleventh Five 
Year Plan to modify government officials’ performance assessments to incentivize better environmental 
governance). 
 31.  See He et al., supra note 3, at 133; Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 169; Lee, supra note 26, at 
809 (blaming China’s loose enforcement on environmental laws on the decentralized structure of 
enforcement of environmental laws and the prioritization of economic growth over environmental 
protection). 
 32.  See, e.g., Joseph Kahn & Jim Yardley, As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extreme, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at A1 (describing the political and economic obstacles to greater 
environmental protection in China). 
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as important for economic growth continue to face stiff opposition.33 But 
when political patronage and economic interests take precedence over the 
faithful implementation of these laws, environmental protection suffers 
alongside other fundamental goals of good governance. 
At the end of the day, the task at hand is clear.  For Chinese 
environmental law to succeed at its increasingly urgent objectives, it must 
become more than an elaborate paper tiger. In the second wave of 
environmental governance, leadership at all levels must reckon more 
effectively with the costs of unfettered development. Serious changes in the 
culture of regulatory governance will be required, in which officials are 
rewarded not only for their contributions toward planned economic growth, 
but also for verifiable accomplishments in safeguarding environmental 
values.34 Most of all, environmental law must move from the present era of 
exhortation toward a more mature era of consistent implementation and 
enforcement.  
 There are many possible starting points for environmental reform, and 
Chinese environmental leaders have proposed ambitious plans to begin the 
process.35 Yet however change unfolds, China will have to wrestle with 
three basic challenges that continue to obstruct enforcement efforts: (1) 
effective pollution source management, (2) faithful local implementation of 
national environmental policies, and (3) reliable judicial access by the 
victims of environmental harm. This article considers these three distinct 
hurdles and their implications for the relationship between environmental 
governance and broader rule-of-law challenges in China.  
 
 33.  Id. (“For the Communist Party, the political calculus is daunting. Reining in economic growth 
to alleviate pollution may seem logical, but the country’s authoritarian system is addicted to fast 
growth. Delivering prosperity placates the public, provides spoils for well-connected officials and 
forestalls demands for political change. A major slowdown could incite social unrest, alienate business 
interests and threaten the party’s rule.”).  
 34.  See Wang Alex L., supra note 30, at 368 (describing the adoption of cadre evaluation for 
environmental targets). 
 35.  For example, Wang Canfa, a well-known professor at China University of Political Science 
and Law and Director of the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims, suggests that “[i]n order 
to overcome these current deficiencies, Chinese authorities should: establish an Environmental 
Supervision Bureau within SEPA [China’s central environmental protection agency] responsible for 
‘spot’ law enforcement; transform the environmental protection agency into smaller, detached entities; 
reform current assessment methods of local governmental compliance and achievement; replace the 
traditional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) analysis with a Green GDP; reform current judicial 
management mechanisms; free courts from the influence of local governments; establish environmental 
public interest legislation; and create a successful procedure for enhancing public participation in 
Chinese environmental protection.” Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 160. See also Robert V. Percival & 
Zhao Huiyu, The Role of Civil Society in Environmental Governance in the United States and China, 24 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 140 (cautioning against importing the American model of environmental 
governance wholesale into China). 
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Part I reviews environmental enforcement lapses against polluters and 
the resulting groundswell of public frustration over health and safety.  Part 
II explores the frequently broken link in the enforcement chain that occurs 
between central policymaking and local implementation. Part III reviews 
routine failures by the judicial system to provide redress for the victims of 
environmental harm and deterrence against future wrongdoing. Part IV 
considers environmental enforcement problems as a subcategory of more 
generalized failures of the rule of law in China. Part V concludes with a 
modest but concrete suggestion for advancing rule-of-law objectives 
through judicial reform that would materially benefit environmental 
governance. The proposal would facilitate the development of greater 
judicial access and accountability, without imposing a fully Westernized 
model or triggering the massive political upheaval that most Chinese fear. 
 
I. WEAK ENFORCEMENT AGAINST VIOLATORS 
 
The most obvious challenge for Chinese environmental governance is 
that its laws, rules, and policies36 are of limited value in protecting the 
public from harm if their operative provisions are not regularly and 
credibly enforced against polluters. Accurate statistics about environmental 
enforcement are elusive, but anecdotal reports of implementation failures 
are widespread.37 Law Professor Wang Canfa, an internationally known 
Chinese environmental activist, summarizes the problem this way: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36.  As discussed further in Part II, Chinese environmental governance flows from a web of 
statutes, rules, public policy plans, leadership statements, and other sources of sovereign authority. See 
infra notes 100–106 and accompanying text. For ease, I refer to all of these collectively as “law” unless 
otherwise specified. 
 37.  See, e.g., Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 181; Li Zhiping, The Challenges of China’s 
Discharge Permit System and Effective Solutions, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 375, 379–82 
(2005) (discussing failures of the pollutant discharge permit system including a low implementation 
rate, distorted implementation, and a lack of determinability, stability, continuity, and authority). 
Professor Li attributes these problems to a lack of legislative support, the agency’s unwillingness and 
inability to enforce, problems of economic analysis, and defects in the permitting procedure. Id. But see 
Dellapenna, supra note 23, at 367 (suggesting that Li’s proposed solutions may be difficult to 
implement for cultural reasons). See also China and the World Discuss the Environment, CHINA 
DIALOGUE BLOG, https://www.chinadialogue.net/ (providing a forum for reporting on specific 
environmental problems in China). 
Ryan - Final (Do Not Delete) 7/21/2014  4:29 PM 
Fall 2013]    ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 193 
Chinese environmental laws and regulations are abundant, but suffer 
from a lack of proper adherence and enforcement. This deficiency 
remains prevalent because: legislative objectives remain unachieved; 
enforcement is superficial; excessive time exists between noncompliance 
and enforcement; available punishment for noncompliance is inadequate; 
injured parties are not properly compensated; and some environmental 
crimes receive administrative instead of criminal punishments.38 
Environmental concerns have long taken a backseat to economic 
development priorities, an understandable accommodation as the new 
nation struggled to lift millions of people from abject poverty in the early 
days of economic reform.39 Nevertheless, the growing Chinese middle class 
is now questioning this calculus.40 Enormous public frustration has been 
brewing over the government’s ongoing tolerance of profitable but toxic 
production methods at the expense of public health.41   
This Part reviews the unfolding crisis of public confidence in the 
enforcement of environmental laws against polluters, together with the 
reasons enforcement efforts so often fall short. 
 
A. The Crisis of Public Confidence in Environmental Governance 
A recent wave of mass environmental protests underscores deep 
public anxiety over the government’s commitment to environmental 
protection, notwithstanding the aspirational promises of the nation’s 
environmental laws.42 A 2011 study by researchers at Nankai University in 
North China reported that “almost 90,000 such ‘mass incidents’ of riots, 
protests, mass petitions and other acts of unrest” took place in 2009 alone, 
many reflecting public alarm about the adverse health consequences of 
pollution.43 New research indicates that environmental protests grew in 
 
 38.  Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 159. 
 39.  See, e.g., Yang, supra note 1, at 146 (attributing traditional preference of economic 
development over environmental protection to social development and poverty alleviation). 
 40.  Cf. Wong, supra note 20 (“Awareness of various kinds of pollution—air, water and soil—has 
risen quickly this year, especially among middle-class urbanites.”). 
 41.  See Jennifer Duggan, Kunming Pollution Protest is Tip of Rising Chinese Environmental 
Activism, GUARDIAN (May 16, 2013, 11:59 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/chinas-
choice/2013/may/16/kunming-pollution-protest-chinese-environmental-activism (“The Chinese public 
are becoming increasing [sic] concerned about the state of their local environment and up to 80% 
believe that environmental protection should be a higher priority than economic development, 
according to a new survey . . . carried out by the Public Opinion Research Centre in collaboration with 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University.”). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See Sui-Lee Wee, China Says Will Shut Plant As Thousands Protest, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 
2011, 5:47 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/14/us-china-protests-
idUSTRE77D0EK20110814 (noting that “([e]nvironmental pollution is one of the major causes of 
social unrest in China” and describing the Nankai University study). 
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frequency by 120 percent between 2010 and 2011.44 Chinese environmental 
law suffers from such serious under-enforcement that the public apparently 
lacks confidence that these laws will truly protect them from harm.45  
In an especially dramatic example, 12,000 citizens in the coastal city 
of Dalian took to the streets on August 14, 2011 to protest a local 
petrochemical plant’s production of paraxylene, a carcinogen used in the 
manufacture of polyester and other plastic products.46 The plant had been 
fully operational for two years, although it had operated in its first year 
without the required environmental approval from provincial officials.47 
However, even the mandatory environmental review did not quell public 
fear about potential safety hazards. Concerned that factory storage tanks 
could rupture during a storm, thousands of protesters occupied the People’s 
Square opposite City Hall.48  They remained there for hours until the local 
government publicly promised that the factory would be immediately 
closed and relocated.49 Remarkable both for its numbers and for the fact 
that the government appeared to capitulate to public pressure, the incident 
became known in China as the “8-14 Event”. 
Until recently, public demonstrations of this sort were rare in China, 
because participants can risk serious personal and political consequences.50 
Those who lingered at the 8-14 event reportedly faced police beatings,51 
and demonstrators at other public protests have reportedly been killed in 
clashes with police.52 However, mass environmental protests have taken 
 
 44.  Duggan, supra note 41 (reporting figures from Yang Chaofei, the vice-chairman of the 
Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences). 
 45.  Id. (describing the incidence of large anti-pollution protests and the widespread belief that 
governmental environmental protection information is not transparent). 
 46.  Duggan, supra note 41 (describing paraxylene); Christina Larson, The New Epicenter of 
China’s Discontent, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2011/08/23/the_new_epicenter_of_china_s_discontent (describing the public fears that led to 
the incident); Wee, supra note 43 (describing the protests). 
 47.  Wee, supra note 43 (“Environmental worries in China have stoked calls for expanded rights 
for citizens in the one-party state, but this protest has extended it to calls for more government 
accountability, highlighting the mistrust that Dalian residents have in its leaders.”). 
 48.  Larson, supra note 46.  
 49.  Id. As this article goes to press two years later, however, the factory has yet to be closed. 
 50.  See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, Protests Over Chemical Plant Force Chinese Officials to Back 
Down, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2012, at A4 (“The protests, which followed similar demonstrations in other 
cities in the past year, point to the increasing willingness of the Chinese to take to the streets despite the 
perils of openly challenging the country’s authoritarian government.”). 
 51.  Larson, supra note 46 (“[By] evening, after the light had faded from the sky, a smaller crowd 
was left in People's Square . . . .Now outnumbered by security forces, some were chased and reportedly 
beaten (fortunately, no one died).”). 
 52.  See N. Bruce Duthu, Starbucks in the Forbidden City: Reflections on the Challenges and 
Opportunities for a U.S.-Chinese Partnership on Environmental Law and Policy, 8 VT. J. OF ENVTL. L. 
151, 155 (2007) (“While many of these public protests led to positive responses by government and 
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place regularly in recent years, including the 10,000 who successfully 
aborted plans for a new paraxylene plant in Ningbo after three days of 
protest in 2012,53 the 2,500 who protested the construction of an oil 
refinery near Kunming not one year later,54 and many others. 
Demonstrators across China are increasingly willing to take on the risks of 
public protest, presumably because they fear the risks of inaction even 
more. 
Public expressions of environmental frustration have been effective, 
and China’s leadership is taking environmental concerns more seriously. 
For example, in a stunning victory for governmental transparency and 
accountability, Beijing recently capitulated to intense public pressure and 
began monitoring airborne particulates according to the international PM 
2.5 standard, rather than the antiquated PM 10 standard that allowed for 
rosier reporting but failed to detect the most harmful pollutants.55 Prompted 
by a public uproar after the U.S. Embassy began publishing real-time PM 
2.5 data from a rooftop monitoring station, the Chinese government 
reversed course late in 2011 and adopted the more accurate standard.56  
Since ordering cities to publish their own PM 2.5 data in 2012, 179 cities 
now do so, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection has begun 
ranking the worst offenders. 57 
Nevertheless, the government does not welcome public protest, and 
 
business leaders, the government commonly responds with repressive and violent means. One of the 
most notorious recent clashes occurred in December 2005 in the village of Dongzhou in Guangdong 
Province, where villagers rose up to challenge the siting of a power plant on lands they claimed were 
illegally taken from them. Official reports acknowledged that government forces killed three villagers 
while recent commentary suggests that about 20 people were killed, making it ‘the deadliest use of 
force by the party-state since the [1989] Tiananmen [Square] massacre.’”). 
 53.  Jacobs, supra note 50 (describing the three days of protests, which were occasionally met 
with violence).  
 54.  Duggan, supra note 41 (“Environmental protests are becoming one of the biggest forms of 
social unrest in China”). 
 55.  “PM 2.5” and “PM 10” refer to particulate matter that measures less than 2.5  and 10 
micrometers in diameter, respectively.   Erin Ryan, China Environmental Experiences #3: Breathing 
Air With Heft, ENVTL. L. PROFS BLOG (Apr. 7, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
environmental_law/2012/04/china-environmental-experiences-3-air-with-heft-taste-and-texture.html 
(describing the public confrontations that led to China’s change in course).  See also Simon Denyer, In 
China’s War on Bad Air, Government Decision to Release Data Gives Fresh Hope, WASHINGTON POST 
(Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-chinas-war-on-bad-air-government-decision-
to-release-data-gives-fresh-hope/2014/02/02/5e50c872-8745-11e3-a5bd-
844629433ba3_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines.  
 56. Id.  
 57. See Denyer, supra note 55 (“The ministry’s rankings showed that seven of the ten most 
polluted cities in China in 2013 were in Hebei province, which surrounds the capital and is the center of 
the nation’s steel industry, as well as being a major glass, coke and cement producer. The data made 
one conclusion inescapable: Beijing’s pollution would never be tackled unless Hebei’s heavy industry 
was either cleaned up or shut down.”).  
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even the most successful demonstrations can be met with mixed results. 
For example, after the apparent victory by the Dalian 8-14 protesters, 
records of the protest were expunged from the Chinese Internet.58 Six 
months later, the factory still remained in full operation despite the 
government’s promise of immediate suspension.59 
Taken together, the contemporaneous PM 2.5 and 8-14 events 
showcase a more general problem in Chinese environmental governance, in 
which acknowledgment of the importance of regulation is not always 
followed by actual enforcement against identifiable polluters. In moving to 
the PM 2.5 standard, the government effectively conceded that accurate 
information is needed to successfully combat pollution—but it has so far 
declined to take concrete action in Dalian to resolve public concerns over 
pollution-related harm. A number of factors contribute to these missed 
enforcement opportunities, including limited enforcement capacity, 
political patronage, and conflicting economic priorities. 
 
B. Limited Regulatory Capacity 
To some extent, under-enforcement against pollution sources may 
reflect a problem of capacity within the Chinese government. The Ministry 
of Environmental Protection, which oversees countless sources of pollution 
among a nation of 1.4 billion people, was staffed by as few as 200 
employees in 2007.60 In the same year, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) was staffed by 18,000 to oversee a nation of 300 million.61 
The Chinese Ministry derives support from government research institutes 
with additional personnel, but overall levels still lag far behind U.S. 
capacity. Given the limits of staffing alone, it is easy to imagine how holes 
in the enforcement net might appear. 
That said, the government is currently marshalling all available 
capacity to confront the staggering personal and political costs of the air 
 
 58.  Larson, supra note 46.  Notwithstanding even Wikipedia’s recognition of the 8-14 event, the 
government’s efforts to quell its social influence have been at least partially successful.  Dalian PX 
Protest, WIKIPEDIA.ORG http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dalian_PX_protest (last modified Dec. 18, 2013, 
5:59 AM). One learned Chinese professor from a respected university assured me that few of his 
colleagues know about it, and they seldom discuss it. Email communication with author [name withheld 
for protection] (Oct. 25, 2013, 5:15 AM) (on file with author). 
 59.  Jaime FlorCruz & Haolan Hong, Controversial Chemical Plant Resumes Production in 
China, CNN (Jan. 17, 2012, 6:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/17/world/asia/china-chemical-
plant (reporting that the plant had resumed production despite the promise of immediate suspension that 
had quelled the protest the previous year, and reporting on the local government’s financial stake in the 
plant). 
 60.  Kahn & Yardley, supra note 32. Until 2008, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) 
was known as the State Environmental Protection Administration.   
 61.  Id.  
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pollution crisis.62 In September of 2013, the central government announced 
a $280 billion plan to improve air quality, including plans to limit the use 
of coal and ban high-polluting vehicles.63 In January of 2014, the central 
government also launched an ambitious new program requiring public 
disclosure of industrial pollution, even by state-owned enterprises.64 This 
landmark reporting program has the potential to mitigate the burden of 
physical inspections on strained agency personnel and to harness voluntary 
contributions by interested members of the public.65   
In a move hailed by domestic and international environmental 
watchdogs, the central government is now requiring 15,000 factories to 
provide real-time public accounting of discharged pollutants to air and 
water.66 In theory, real-time reporting facilitates the ability of agency staff 
to target the worst violators and enables them to more efficiently allocate 
enforcement resources. More importantly, the system enables NGOs and 
local people to assist environmental enforcement by essentially crowd-
sourcing public capacity.67 Concerned citizens can now follow their local 
data stream, reality-test its accuracy, and bring concerns to the attention of 
the government.68  
Such benefits presume industry compliance, so the success of the 
program still hinges on the ability of the government to enforce accurate 
reporting. However, early experience with the program has been 
encouraging. According to Ma Jun, the head of the Institute of Public and 
Environmental Affairs in Beijing, the system is already working to identify 
violations, and it will enable his organization and others to directly support 
agency enforcement efforts.69  As reported in the WASHINGTON POST: 
[I]t is the focus on individual factories that really gives environmentalists 
such as Ma reason for optimism. Although several provinces have yet to 
comply with the government’s edict to publish data, figures from Hebei 
are available and show factories brazenly flaunting limits on emissions. 
 
 62. See Denyer, supra note 55 (“The country’s appalling air is blamed for more than a million 
premature deaths a year, for producing acid rain that damages the nation’s agriculture, for driving away 
tourists and even for encouraging the brightest students to study abroad. Perhaps just as important, 
Beijing’s bad air has been making its Communist leaders lose face.”).  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. (“Since Jan. 1, the central government has required 15,000 factories — including 
influential state-run enterprises — to publicly report details on their air emissions and water discharges 
in real time, an unprecedented degree of disclosure that is shedding light on the who, what, when and 
where of China’s devastating environmental problems.”).  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
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Ma is working with experts to design a phone app that could vividly 
expose the offenders, with factories meeting emissions targets showing 
up as blue and those breaking the law coded red.  “What we aim to do, 
through public pressure, is help the environment protection bureau to 
enforce the law,” he said.70 
Linda Greer of the Natural Resources Defense Council, a U.S.-based 
environmental NGO, told the WASHINGTON POST that the “reporting 
requirement for factories is the ‘biggest thing’ China has done to address its 
pollution problems, and the most likely to produce results.”71  The United 
States EPA launched a similar reporting program in 1986, the Toxics 
Release Inventory, which Greer heralds as one of the agency’s most 
successful regulatory programs.72  However, she notes that “China’s real-
time disclosure program is bigger than anything the EPA has done:”73 
“It brings them from the back of the pack globally, in terms of public 
information disclosure, to the front of the pack,” Greer added…. 
“Inevitably it will strengthen the hand of regulators when they have bad 
air pollution days, to look at real-time data.” 74 
 
C. The Influence of Political Patronage 
Limited capacity can still pose serious enforcement obstacles, but the 
problem has also been a matter of political will.75 The new reporting 
requirement is especially encouraging because its deployment of public 
accountability promises to limit the infamous interference of political 
patronage in effective environmental enforcement.  In China, the tale of the 
polluting factory that evades enforcement no matter how egregious the 
violation is all too common.76 In some cases, factory operators bribe 
 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75.  See, e.g., Patti Goldman, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in China: Lessons Learned 
from the U.S. Experience, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 253 (2007) (“The environmental agencies lack the 
resources, and sometimes the will, to exercise their investigation and enforcement authority to cabin in 
polluting industries that contribute to the local tax base.”). See also A Great Wall of Waste, ECONOMIST, 
Aug. 19, 2004, at 56 (“It is no rarity . . . to find a bureau imposing a fine on a dirty local enterprise (thus 
fulfilling its duty), but then passing the money on to the local administration, which refunds it to the 
company via a tax break.”).  
 76.  See, e.g., Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 181.  As Professor Wang describes, “Li Jianguo and 
four other victims were peasants living on the bank of the Tingliu River, Laoting County of Hebei 
Province. In February 2000, Lefeng Steel Plant which lies to the east of Li Jianguo's village, began to 
manufacture steel. According to the related laws and regulations, the steel plant was a severe polluter 
and should have been closed. It had not completed either an environmental protection examination or 
approval procedures during its construction and there were no active environmental protective measures 
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government officials to avoid enforcement, a custom that has become an 
accepted cost of doing business in the culture of corruption that pervades 
Chinese governance.77 In other cases, industrialists benefit from a strong 
social network that dissuades the enforcement agency from taking action.78 
Personal connections, or guanxi, are part of the fundamental fabric of 
 
in place. The factory seriously polluted the local environment. In May 2000, crops and vegetation 
around the plant began to wither and die. The village leader, Zhao Wentu, and several other victims 
reported the incidents to the local authorities and the county environmental protection agency, but 
nothing was done.  Because of this inaction, 100 villagers blocked the door to the plant, stopping steel 
production and the noxious emissions.” Id. The villagers elected six leaders to represent them in 
negotiating with the plant, who were later sentenced to prison for inciting a mob.Id.  
  One of my former Chinese students shared another example: “There is water pollution in a 
small village, Baimiao Village, which is located by the side of Minjiang river that goes through Sichuan 
province. The villagers believe that the newly-built pesticide factory polluted the water and make the 
water undrinkable or even unusable. They started pressing the local government for an explanation why 
companies like this could successfully pass environmental impact assessment to engage this pesticide 
production activity. Surprisingly, they managed to take pictures of [the damning] original 
environmental impact assessment, and used it as evidence to sue Environmental Protection Department 
of Sichuan province. The villagers lost both at trial and on appeal. The source that I found did not 
provide reasons why the villagers lost.” Email to author [name withheld for student’s protection], Aug. 
24, 2013, 9:11 PM (on file with author).  See also Baimiao Water War, SINA (May 28, 2013, 3:45 PM), 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5fbaf32e0101asrz.html (providing photographs of the pollution at issue 
in the lawsuit). 
 77.  See, e.g., Patricia Ross McCubbin, China and Climate Change: Domestic Environmental 
Needs, Differentiated International Responsibilities, and Rule of Law Weaknesses, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY 
L. POL’Y J. 200, 230 (2008) (“[T]he judiciary is rife with corruption, so polluters can often buy their 
way out of environmental obligations.”); cf. Simon Denyer, China Arrests Anti-corruption Activists 
Even as it Pledges to Oust Dishonest Officials, WASH. POST (July 23, 2013), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-23/world/40735291_1_liu-zhijun-corruption-xu-zhiyong 
(describing rampant corruption in Chinese politics); Jia Lynn Yang, Ji Yingnan and Other Jilted 
Mistresses Expose Chinese Officials’ Corruption, WASH. POST (July 25, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ji-yingnan-and-other-jilted-mistresses-expose-chinese-officials-
corruption/2013/07/25/8d8d35f6-eb02-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html (same). For a discussion of 
the ubiquitous “hidden rules” of corruption in which governmental officials and others routinely 
engage, see Rocky Wen, Don’t Get Confused By “Hidden Rules,” GLOBAL TIMES (Aug. 11, 2009, 8:22 
PM), http://www.globaltimes.cn/opinion/commentary/2009-08/456674.html (“Though these ‘hidden 
rules’ were viewed as illegal or immoral and conflicted with the official rules, all but a few abided by 
these qian guize in order to safeguard their interests. Those who ignored the qian guize were usually 
punished or disfavored.”). 
 78.  For example, a former Chinese environmental law student interned for an environmental 
NGO fighting gold mining pollution along the Biliu River in Liaoning Province, which had seriously 
harmed the local people. Email to author [name withheld for student’s protection] (Aug. 23, 2013) (on 
file with author). The NGO planned to file a lawsuit against the mining company until it discovered that 
the man in charge of the mining company was a high government official, which, as the student 
described, “makes it a hard case to resolve through the legal process.” See also Kristen McDonald, 
Winter Travels with Blue Dalian (Mar. 13, 2012, 1:02 PM), 
http://pacificenvironment.org/blog/2012/03/winter-travels-with-blue-dalian/ (explaining that the 
pollution issue remains unresolved due in part to a fear of confronting mining companies, “most of 
which are controlled by powerful local government officials and have deep connections in their 
communities.”).  
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Chinese commerce and politics.79 Individual bureaucrats shy away from 
taking action against a well-connected violator if doing so could jeopardize 
their place in the professional hierarchy.80 Government official hesitate to 
make political enemies by alienating interested officials higher up the 
chain. 
Political patronage and government corruption are pervasive problems 
in China, complicating environmental enforcement and the rule of law 
more generally.81 Chinese leaders are confronting the problem of self-
dealing officials with increasing force, concerned by waning public 
confidence in government. Party General Secretary and President Xi 
Jinping recently announced a new anti-corruption campaign, promising to 
punish bribery and reform the entrenched culture of excess among 
government officials.82 Nevertheless, critics have questioned the prospects 
of the campaign, especially after the subsequent arrest of law professor and 
 
 79.  See, e.g., Jerome Cohen, Keynote, An Introduction to Law in China, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 393, 
402 (2007) (“The biggest problem in achieving fair adjudication in China, and it affects commercial 
arbitration as well as court decisions, is “guanxi,” that network of family, friendships and other contacts 
and reciprocities by which Chinese live and that seems to undermine all hope of evenhanded 
enforcement of the law.”). 
 80.  The spectacular scandal involving the fall of former Party Leader Bo Xilai and former 
Chongqing Chief of Police Wang Lijun provides one example of this common dynamic. See, e.g., Katie 
Hunt, Wang Lijun: Chinese Cop at the Heart of Bo Xilai Scandal, CNN (Aug. 19, 2013, 12:55 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/18/world/asia/profile-wang-lijun; Michael Wines, In Rise and Fall of 
Chinese Boss, A Ruthless Arc, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2012), at A1 (describing the long-tolerated 
misbehavior of fallen leader Bo Xilai out of fear of repercussions). 
 81.  See sources cited supra note 77. Some of my former Chinese law students, many of whom 
had been placed into the law major by fiat rather than personal choice, privately expressed their deep 
personal reluctance to become lawyers because they feared being forced to participate in the cycle of 
corruption endemic to the legal system. They told me that as lawyers, they would be expected to bribe 
judges and wield personal connections as necessary to win their cases. Everyone knows, I was assured, 
that the best lawyer to hire is the wife of a judge—because she will have social connections with all the 
local judges that she can wield in support of her clients. Oral communications to author by multiple 
Chinese students (Nov. 2011) [names withheld for their protection].   
  Professor Cohen describes a similar phenomenon: “Not long ago, I asked a fortyish Chinese 
businessman whether he used lawyers in his work. ‘No,’ he said, ‘I don't need lawyers. I use standard 
trade contracts for both my local and international business.’ I said: ‘But don't you have disputes?’ ‘Oh, 
of course I have disputes,’ he replied. I said: ‘Then don't you need a lawyer to help you in disputes?’ He 
responded: ‘Why should I hire a lawyer? My wife is a judge.’ Through her he could go to whatever 
local court he had to in order to get the case taken care of. This attitude permeates Chinese society and 
demoralizes many of its younger lawyers.” Cohen, supra note 79, at 403.  See also Robert Marquand, 
New for China’s Courts: Trained Judges, Standard Rules, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 16, 2001, 
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0816/p1s3-woap.html (quoting a Chinese lawyer’s 
explanation that “An American lawyer might win with legal knowledge, history, case law, and briefs. In 
China, what still matters is the lawyer's contacts, money, and the human influence.”). 
 82.  See, e.g., Bi Mingxin, Xi’s Anti-Corruption Resolution Arouses Public Expectations, 
XINHUANET (Jan. 24, 2013, 12:10 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-
01/24/c_132123521.htm (describing the plan, including a “cage of regulations”—prevention and 
disciplinary measures that will reduce opportunities and incentives for corruption).  
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noted anti-corruption activist Xu Zhiyong.83 After calling on public 
officials to disclose their financial assets and to release jailed corruption 
protesters,84 Professor Xu was convicted of “gathering a crowd to disturb 
public order” and sentenced to four years in prison.85 Analysts had cited 
transparency and the disclosure of officials’ assets as critical to the success 
of President Xi’s plan, making the prosecution of Professor Xu especially 
troubling.86 
 
D. Economic Development Conflicts 
Environmental enforcement actions can also dissolve when the 
relevant agency is instructed not to pursue a violation for less nefarious 
reasons.87 Distinguishable from self-dealing enforcement failures, 
enforcement is sometimes curtailed because leaders with influence 
genuinely believe that enforcement would not serve the public interest as 
they understand it. More often than not, the concern is that the enforcement 
action would unduly interfere with the government’s overarching goal of 
increasing gross domestic product.88 
Enforcement decisions are vulnerable to veto by even non-agency 
officials because of the many paths of exchange among the organs of 
Chinese governance. In China, the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches are more interconnected than their counterparts in the U.S.; there 
is no corresponding separation of powers principle.89 Moreover, all 
 
 83.  E.g., Matt Schiavenza, Why Xi Jinping’s ‘Anti-Corruption Campaign’ is Hollow, Unserious, 
and Ultimately Doomed, THE ATLANTIC (July 18, 2013, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/07/why-xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign-is-
hollow-unserious-and-ultimately-doomed/277908/. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley,China Sentences Xu Zhiyong, Legal Activist, to 4 Years in 
Prison, New York Times (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/world/asia/china-
sentences-xu-zhiyong-to-4-years-for-role-in-protests.html?_r=0. 
 86.  See Bi, supra note 82.  
 87.  See Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 171. 
 88.  See Li, supra note 37, at 380–81 (noting that “environmental regulation adds cost to industry 
and may thus slow the speed of economic development” and that “[i]n the view and ideology of many 
government officials in China, economic development always comes before environmental 
protection”); Wang Mingyuin, supra note 28, at 245 (“[T]he predominance of GDP as a supreme 
indicator for political merit . . . induced local governments . . . to blindly pursue local GDP growth for 
their own self-interest, without showing concern for the social and environmental costs.”). 
 89.  The State Council, “the highest executive organ of state power,” supervises the administrative 
functions of government. See The State Council, CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T, P.R.C., 
http://english.gov.cn/2013-03/15/content_2354765.htm (last updated Mar. 16, 2013); The 
Organizational Structure of the State Council, CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T, P.R.C., 
http://english.gov.cn/links.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). According to the Chinese Constitution, the 
State Council reports to the National People’s Congress. The Relationship Between the People’s 
Congresses, the State Administrative Organs, the People’s Courts and People’s Procuratorates, CENT. 
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branches are effectively subordinate to the directives of the political wing 
of Chinese governance, the Chinese Communist Party.90 The Party operates 
in concert with the constitutional branches through a parallel structure at all 
levels of government.91 Officials move freely between Party and 
constitutional posts, sometimes holding them simultaneously.92 Matters of 
state, including enforcement and implementation decisions, are not handled 
solely by the nominally responsible agency but through a process of 
consultation involving higher-up officials elsewhere in governance. When 
there is upper-level consensus that enforcement is not in the public interest, 
that decision will be made manifest down the chain.93 
Many environmental violations have thus been openly tolerated 
because enforcement would have interfered with competing economic or 
political priorities. In one recent example, officials in the northern province 
of Shanxi waived environmental regulations to boost the ailing coal 
industry at the center of the provincial economy—even though coal-related 
pollution threatens local water supplies and may have contributed to 
notorious public health crises.94 Shanxi is one of the most polluted cities in 
China, with a local rate of birth defects that is 600 percent higher than the 
national average.95 However, when the coal industry began to decline due 
 
PEOPLE’S GOV’T, P.R.C., http://english.gov.cn/2005-09/02/content_28453.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 
2013). However, most contemporary political accounts point to the State Council as the true seat of 
governmental power in China, and explain that it reports to the Chinese Communist Party. E.g., Patrick 
Chovanec, Primer on China’s Leadership Transition, AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE FROM CHINA (May 
8, 2011), http://chovanec.wordpress.com/2011/05/08/primer-on-chinas-leadership-transition/ (“The first 
and most important thing to understand about that political system is that it is composed of three parts. 
In the U.S., we have the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. In China there is 
the Party, the Army, and the State. Unlike in the U.S., where the three branches are co-equal and are 
specifically designed to check and balance each other’s powers, in China the Party is supreme and rules 
over the other two elements.”). 
 90.  Chovanec, supra note 89.   
 91.  Id.   
 92.  For example, the Secretary General of the Party, currently Xi Jinping, is also the President of 
China. His predecessor, Hu Jintao, simultaneously held the same positions. Such a transfer of power is 
mandated by the constitution. Xianfa art. 22, ch. 3 (2002) (China). 
 93.  See, e.g., supra notes 46–59 and accompanying text (describing the aftermath of the Dalian 8-
14 event).   
 94.  Luna Lin, Shanxi Province: Saving the Coal Industry, But Sacrificing the Environment, 
CHINA DIALOGUE (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/6300-Shanxi-
province-saving-the-coal-industry-but-sacrificing-the-environment (highlighting the serious 
consequences associated with the provincial response, the article notes that the Shanxi environmental 
agency’s chief engineer says that Shanxi’s water resources have been seriously damaged by the coal 
industry, and that the BBC reports that the rate of birth defects in Shanxi is six times the national 
average).  
 95.  James Reynolds, Disabilities in China’s Polluted Shanxi, BBC (Apr. 24, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8012852.stm (reporting on overwhelming environmental 
pollution in Shanxi and its probable relationship to birth defects, and on local doctors’ beliefs that 
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to reduced domestic demand, provincial leaders acted to stabilize the 
market by instituting subsidies and temporarily eliminating environmental 
protection fees.96 The move earned praise for strengthening industry 
competitiveness, but criticism from those who saw it as “yet another 
example of sacrificing the environment for the sake of the economy.”97 
The lack of consistent enforcement against identifiable violators is a 
patent and troubling failure in Chinese environmental law. However, one 
root cause is a less conspicuous failure relating to the overall structure of 
Chinese governance. This more subtle enforcement failure takes place 
somewhere between the national level, where environmental laws and 
policies are made, and the provincial and municipal levels where they must 
eventually be implemented. 
 
II. WEAK LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF  
CENTRAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTIVES 
 
The second enforcement challenge for Chinese environmental 
governance is the problem of central-provincial relations—revealing a 
surprisingly weak link in the regulatory chain by which China’s centrally 
planned governance is locally administered. Even when the national 
government sets stringent anti-pollution goals, securing provincial and 
municipal implementation is not always easy. It has proven especially 
challenging because municipal budgets and local officials’ job security are 
still so closely aligned with competing economic development targets.98 
The challenge for central regulators goes beyond the task of ensuring 
that environmental laws are enforced against violators at the local level. 
The larger task is to motivate local officials to credibly implement national 
policies designed to place environmental protection at a higher level of 
 
malnutrition may be responsible).  
 96.  Lin, supra note 94 (“Shanxi has responded to the slump with a stimulus package . . . 
includ[ing] temporarily scrapping the environmental protection fees and industrial transformation 
development charges for coal mines.”). 
 97.  Id. (quoting Feng Yongfeng, “the founder of Nature University, a Beijing-based Green 
NGO”). 
 98.  See Lee, supra note 26, at 805 (noting that local environmental agencies “are often unwilling 
to vigorously enforce environmental mandates from the central government, generally because of local 
protectionism”); Wang Alex L., supra note 30, at 399 (discussing the role of cadre evaluation targets in 
this context); Wang Canfra, supra note 3 at 171; Wang Mingyuin, supra note 28, at 245 (“When 
combined with a highly centralized ‘personal rule’ political structure and the predominance of GDP as a 
supreme indicator for political merit, [the development strategy of ‘placing focus on economic 
construction’] induced local governments—especially some Party heads—to blindly pursue local GDP 
growth for their own self-interest, without showing concern for the social and environmental costs.”); 
Kahn & Yardley, supra note 32.  
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consideration before violations can occur—for example, when they 
approve future development projects or enact local land use planning 
policies that portend harmful environmental consequences.99 Problems also 
arise when the enforcement of even mandatory environmental regulations 
conflict with countervailing policy targets, as demonstrated when Shanxi 
waived environmental fees to support the local coal economy. 
This Part explores obstacles of local implementation by analysis of the 
complex relationships between Chinese statutory law and regulatory 
planning, local and national policy priorities, and central and provincial 
structures of governance. Mixed messages from the central government 
may also contribute to local enforcement breakdowns. At times, the 
resulting dynamics of Chinese environmental governance are surprisingly 
evocative of those associated with American environmental federalism.  
 
A. Conflicts Between Law and Plan 
Some of these hurdles reflect the complex relationship in China 
between statutory law and public policy more generally. In China, the line 
between law and policy is not always distinct, and in many respects, policy 
is the more important tool of governance.100 Whereas all acts of American 
governance require authority from specific constitutional or statutory 
delegations, Chinese governance operates more independently from 
statutory sources of law. In particular, the formal statements of party 
consensus set forth in the cyclical Five Year Plans confer as much force as 
legislative statutes, and oftentimes more. In these plans, officials are 
sometimes directed to implement policies by taking action that is not 
otherwise authorized by statute—suggesting that the policy directive itself 
confers the needed authority, from a reservoir of sovereignty that must 
exist beyond the system of constitutional and statutory law.101 
 
 99.  Cf. Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 169. 
 100.  Dan Guttman, Different Operating Systems, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec.2008, at 27, 27, available at 
www.epa.gov/ogc/china/guttman.pdf (contrasting the CCP/executive policy planning-based legal 
system in China with the legislative statute-based legal system in the U.S.). Professor Guttman 
specifically questions the value of scholarship that treats ‘law’ “in the absence of upfront discussion of 
the role of law as one of many ‘rule sets’—and [that mistakenly treats law] the most important one. If 
the question is ‘is China taking action to address environmental concerns and is it working?’ [then] 
‘law’ is not now near core of the answer. But this does not mean there are not actions and ‘rules’ which 
guide them.” Email communication with author (Oct. 19, 2013) (on file with author). As he explains, 
“China now has panoply of environmental ‘laws.’ But the most important rules are not what American 
[or Chinese lawyers] would call ‘law.’” Id. 
 101.  See Dan Guttman & Song Yaqin, Making Central-Local Relations Work: Comparing 
American and China Environmental Governance Systems, 1 FRONTIERS ENVTL. SCI. & ENG’G CHINA 
418, 422–23 (2007) (describing the Chinese institution of the Five Year Plan); Dì shí'èr gè wǔ nián 
jìhuà (第十二个五年计划) Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-15) (promulgated by National People’s 
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Each Five Year Plan is a detailed management program of central 
planning, designed to facilitate the implementation of social and economic 
policies by establishing specific governance targets over a specified 
period.102 Formulated by the Party and approved by the national legislature, 
the Five Year Plans and accompanying Work Statements establish 
economic development targets from products manufactured and housing 
units constructed to the number of Ph.D.s that Chinese universities should 
grant in a given field, all based on projections of what the country will need 
at the end of the projected time horizon.103 Five Year Plans are formulated 
by central leadership and imposed on each successive lower level of 
government as it adopts its own Five Year Plan in light of the national 
plan.104 As aforementioned, because there is not always a clear statutory 
basis for the government action required to implement these policies, the 
plans themselves may function like an authorizing statute in U.S. law.105 
Other non-statutory sources of rules that bear on Chinese governance 
include leadership statements, official internal documents, public 
documents, and other formal communications that include suggestions 
intended for implementation.106 
Statutory laws and Five Year Plans thus operate in coordination, if 
loosely at times. But when law and plan collide—for example, if enforcing 
a given environmental law would interfere with the local government’s 
economic targets under the operative Five Year Plan—the plan often comes 
out on top. Plans increasingly include environmental targets in addition to 
production goals,107 but the tacit understanding among plan implementers 
 
Congress Mar. 14, 2011) (Trans. English Delegation of the European Union to China). 
 102.  See JOSEPH CASEY & KATHERINE KOLESKI, U.S. & CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM., 
BACKGROUNDER: CHINA’S 12TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN 1 (2011), available at http://permanent.access. 
gpo.gov/gpo24710/12th-FiveYearPlan_062811.pdf. 
 103.  See id. at 1, 4. 
 104.  Guttman & Song, supra note 101, at 423–24. 
 105.  Id. 
106.  As Professor Guttman has explained, other non-statutory sources of rules include “(1) leadership 
statements, especially those declaring and  defining a ‘movement’ (yun dong); (2) public documents 
that may have no analog in the U.S., e.g., yjian (or ‘suggestion’); (3) internal documents (sometimes 
made public) that may have no analog in U.S. law… such as hongtou wenjian (‘red headed document’), 
pizhun (‘leader signature signifying approval or ratification on a document’), and pishi (higher level 
comment which may have effect depending on substance and [hierarchical] relationship).  The status of 
such rules or requirements as ‘law’ (or their evolution in relation to "law") is, perhaps, to be sorted 
out.”  Email communications (Oct. 19, 2013 and Dec. 8, 2013) (on file with author). 
 107.  For example, the Twelfth Five Year Plan includes elaborate plans to combat climate change, 
including green development plans, carbon markets, and reforestation plans. Government White Paper 
on China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change, at pt. VII, (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-11/22/content_2000272_8.htm (detailing Plan commitments to 
combat global warming, which include green development plans, carbon markets, and reforestation 
plans).  
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appears to be that economic development still takes precedence.108  While 
government officials are routinely rewarded for meeting economic targets 
with promotions, there have been fewer corresponding rewards for 
environmental protection, signaling what leadership values most.109 As a 
result, Chinese news reports acknowledged that in 2010, the cost of 
development-associated environmental degradation was about $230 
billion—3.5 percent of GDP and three times the cost tallied in 2004.110 
When environmental and economic plan elements collide, goes the 
common wisdom, economic targets usually come out on top.111 
The common wisdom may be shifting in Beijing, however, as 
evidenced by important environmental provisions in the two most recent 
Five Year Plans. The Eleventh Five Year Plan indicated centralized efforts 
to elevate environmental priorities by introducing environmental criteria 
into government officials’ performance reviews.112 The Twelfth Five Year 
Plan included an apparent commitment to experiment with carbon markets 
as a means of combating climate change.113 Beijing has steadily followed 
through on the plan to establish markets in seven pilot cities before 
implementing a national scheme, beginning with the southern city of 
 
 108.  Cf. Jason J. Czarnezki, Climate Policy & U.S.-China Relations, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 659, 669 
(2011) (“China is happy to become far more energy efficient, but will make no emissions limitations 
promises that have the potential to limit overall economic growth.”). 
 109.  Cf. id. at 662; Wang Alex L., supra note 30, at 1 (describing shifts  in the Eleventh Five Year 
Plan, in which “Chinese authorities turned to cadre evaluation — the system for top-down bureaucratic 
personnel assessments — to set high-priority, quantitative environmental targets designed to mobilize 
governors, mayors, and state-owned enterprise leaders in every corner of China’s massive 
bureaucracy”).  Professor Wang hopes that the incorporation of cadre evaluation for environmental 
targets will provide the missing incentive for better regulatory performance.  Id. 
 110.  See Edward Wong, Cost of Environmental Damage in China Growing Rapidly Amid 
Industrialization, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2013), at A4. 
 111.  Some scholars even view environmentally progressive governance in these terms. See, e.g., 
Robert V. Percival, China’s Green Leap Forward toward Global Environmental Leadership, 12 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 633, 635 (2011) (discussing China’s interest in climate governance as related to the 
economic opportunities it creates); Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, 
Politics of Enforcement, and Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 267, 302 (2007) (“The underlying motive behind China’s efforts to reform its 
administrative and legal system is largely driven by the growing concern that the swift deterioration of 
its natural resources will harm its economic growth and affect the overall quality of life.”). See also 
Chris Buckley, Silver Lining in China’s Smog As It Puts Focus on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 
2013, at A6 (observing the connection between economic and environmental goals and reporting that 
“[t]he new leadership wants to reinvigorate the economy by reducing reliance on heavy industry that 
produces high amounts of pollution”). 
 112.  Wang Alex L., supra note 30, at 1. 
 113.  See Wang Xin & Gao Yinan, China to Launch Carbon Market Trading Scheme, PEOPLE’S 
DAILY ONLINE (June 18, 2013, 1:23 PM), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/8288822.html 
(describing the new Shenzhen market).  
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Shenzhen in 2013.114  These efforts warrant considerable praise. 
 
B. Conflicts Between Local and National Priorities 
Yet the common wisdom that economics trumps the environment 
appears firmly entrenched in many provinces beyond easy reach of Beijing, 
exposing the weak link in actualizing well-intended national policies. Local 
reluctance to enforce environmental regulations is often fueled by 
municipal reliance on tax income from polluting industries.115 When local 
governments resist central initiatives, lofty environmental directives stall. 
As Tsinghua University law professor Wang Mingyuan explains: 
The central government must consider the interests of the whole society 
and maintain macroeconomic stability and sustainable, long-term 
economic growth. It depends for this on local governments at different 
levels to implement its policies and guidelines. However, with local 
governments becoming “quasi-enterprises” due to their independent 
economic interests, their interests often come into conflict with the 
central government’s economic policies, including environmental 
protection and renewable energy development policies. Thus, local 
governments either agree outwardly and disagree inwardly, or openly 
disobey the central government in the process of implementation. 
Overcoming these deep-rooted conflicts of interest is an important factor 
for the State’s effective macro regulatory control and administration.116 
While Beijing officials thus increasingly talk the talk of environmental 
reform in national policymaking, too many local officials decline to walk 
the walk at the level of local implementation, where the true die is cast. 
Shanxi’s decision to subsidize the coal industry provides a good 
example, because it was made in the immediate wake of new policies from 
Beijing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by weaning the nation from 
fossil fuels. China’s central government has committed to reducing 
domestic carbon emissions per unit of GDP “by between 40% and 45% 
from 2005 levels by 2020, as well as using non-fossil fuels for about 15% 
of its energy by 2020.”117 The State Council, the highest governing body in 
China, also issued a guideline on thermal coal markets specifically stating 
that “all local governments should not interfere with the normal business 
operation of coal miners and power companies.”  
 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  See, e.g., Ben Blanchard & Andrew Roche, China Threatens Death Penalty for Serious 
Polluters, REUTERS (June 19, 2013, 10:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/us-china-
pollution-idUSBRE95I10D20130619 (“Previous promises to tackle China's pollution crisis have had 
mixed results, and enforcement has been a problem at the local level, where governments often heavily 
rely on tax receipts from polluting industries under their jurisdiction.”).  
 116.  Wang Mingyuin, supra note 28, at 246. 
 117.  Lin, supra note 94. 
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In other words, the State Council had explicitly forbidden subsidies of 
the very sort Shanxi officials imposed.118 Shanxi’s protectionist coal policy 
thus directly contravened the clearly-stated national policy prohibiting local 
subsidies for fossil fuel production. As one commentator noted, “Shanxi’s 
eagerness to invite power plant investments may yet hinder the central 
government’s efforts to reduce emissions and conserve energy,” 
highlighting the problem of central-provincial relations.119 
 
C. Central-Provincial Relations and Chinese “Environmental 
Federalism” 
Westerner observers may wonder how such gaps between central 
policy and local enforcement could materialize in a political system so 
dominated by the center. After all, China is the world’s leading example of 
a centrally organized socialist republic, in which national policymaking is 
conducted between the highest echelons of the Chinese Communist Party 
and central government in Beijing.120 National policies and directives are 
conveyed to the twenty-two provinces,121 five autonomous regions, and six 
independent municipal/administrative districts, which are then tasked with 
implementation.122 Provincial leaders then pass along specific goals and 
directives to local and municipal leaders. In this way, local policies almost 
always stem from central priorities. 
Nevertheless, the success of central planning is highly dependent on 
the cooperation of local leaders, especially in realms that implicate local 
land use. Of course, other areas of Chinese governance may be effectively 
implemented from the center—for example, information management and 
Internet censorship.123 With the right technology, national officials can 
 
 118.  Id.  
 119.  Id.  
 120.  For links to English-language descriptions of the components of China’s structure of 
government, see China’s Political System, CHINA INFO. CTR., available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/25060.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). For an excellent 
diagram showing the relationship between the governing bodies of the Chinese Communist Party and 
central Chinese government, see Chinese Power Structure, ZERO HEDGE, available at 
http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user3303/imageroot/2012/11/20121105_China1_2
.jpg (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). 
 121.  China officially counts twenty-three provinces, including Taiwan, but Taiwan has operated 
under an independent government since separating from the mainland after the Chinese Revolution of 
1949. China Provinces, http://www.china-provinces.com (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). 
 122.  Chinaview – About China, XINHUANET, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-
02/19/content_815536.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). 
 123.  See, e.g., Edward Wong, Beijing Imposes New Rules on Social Networking Sites, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 2011, at A9 (discussing China’s Internet censorship program and new regulations requiring 
microbloggers to register with their actual names and addresses).   
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effectively monitor and control the information moving across networked 
devices from the seat of government in Beijing.124 But environmental and 
land use regulation operates very differently.  As in the United States, 
national officials can set governance objectives, but they must rely heavily 
on local and provincial officials for boots-on-the-ground enforcement and 
expertise.125  
Accordingly, local implementation is where most environmental law 
either succeeds or fails. Beijing bureaucrats are not in a position to monitor 
the local Shanxi coal industry, and they will not necessarily know when the 
water there starts to smell funny. When local governments flout central 
policy as Professor Wang Mingyuan describes, environmental law fails.126 
Local obstruction of national environmental policy in China is 
especially surprising because provincial governments do not operate 
independently from the central government in Beijing in the same way that, 
for example, American states are independent of the central government in 
Washington.127 In China’s unitary system of governance,128 a single source 
of sovereign authority empowers all levels of government, administered in 
concentric circles.129 Beijing sets national policies and delegates 
implementation authority to the provincial governments, which set their 
own targets consistent with national policies and delegate authority 
downward to effect local implementation. Chinese sovereign authority is 
thus nested from the center down to the village like a Russian doll. 
By contrast, in a federal system like that of the United States, the 
central and state governments operate from separate sources of independent 
sovereign authority.130 While the two levels govern simultaneously in 
 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Cf. ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, 150–56 (2012) (discussing the 
example of American water pollution management, in which national environmental policies are 
implemented at the state and local levels).  
 126.  See supra quote accompanying note 116. Cf. Blanchard & Roche, supra note 115 (noting that 
local officials often fail to enforce environmental law because they rely on tax revenues of polluting 
industry).  
 127.  See generally BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 
(Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1992) (proposing a theory of “fragmented 
authoritarianism” to describe the dynamics of Chinese politics). 
 128.  See Xianfa art. 2 (1982) (China); China’s Political System: The Constitutional System, CHINA 
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/26143.htm (summarizing China’s 
Constitution in English). 
 129.  China’s Political System: The Local Administrative System, CHINA INFO. CTR., 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/28842.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (describing nested 
authority within the overall system). 
 130.  The states derive authority from the common law police power to protect public health and 
welfare, while the central government operates from authority conferred by constitutional consensus. 
RYAN, supra note 125, at 7–33.   
Ryan - Final (Do Not Delete) 7/21/2014  4:29 PM 
210 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIV:183 
certain areas of jurisdictional overlap, there are also realms in which 
neither can supplant the other’s authority.  For example, the state must 
defer to federal authority on matters involving war or international 
relations, while the federal government must defer to the states on matters 
of family law that do not implicate federal constitutional rights.131 For this 
reason, environmental governance in the United States is often 
characterized by various forms of negotiation between federal and state 
actors, as the center tries to persuade the states to cooperate with federal 
programs to effectuate national policies.132 The resulting state-federal 
bargaining over design and implementation is a hallmark of American 
environmental federalism.133 
Compared to the unwieldy federal relationship in the United States—
in which the center does not control the states in vast areas of law—it 
might appear that the Chinese central government would have a much 
easier time asserting national laws that require local implementation. 
However, research into Chinese multilevel governance suggests that this 
may not always be the case.134 During my own research, I was periodically 
told that Beijing frequently struggles with provincial compliance, 
especially on matters of environmental enforcement.135 After all, China is 
large, distances are great, and resources are scarce. As American Sinologist 
and law professor Jerry Cohen has described, 
Most Americans have grown up on the assumption that China is run by a 
totalitarian dictatorship led by the Politburo Standing Committee, whose 
rule supposedly reaches every village. But that is a skewed view of the 
actual situation. Once I started working in China I learned that in many, 
not all, respects the country is more like a series of feudal baronies. The 
reach of the central Party and government authorities is limited, except 
for those matters that are accorded the highest priority, such as 
suppression of what used to be called “counterrevolution,” espionage, 
 
 131.  Id. at xii–xv. 
 132.  Id. at 265–314.  
 133.  Id.  
 134.  See generally ZHENG YONGNIAN, DE FACTO FEDERALISM IN CHINA: REFORMS AND 
DYNAMICS OF CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS (2007) (discussing the decentralizing effects of modern 
governance reform in China). 
 135.  This first occurred at a conference of the United Nations Institute for Training & Research, 
Second Global Conference on Environmental Governance and Democracy, which took place at Yale 
University in New Haven, CT in 2010. Foreign researchers approached me about the Chinese analogy 
on Sept. 18, 2010, aftermy presentation on intergovernmental bargaining and climate regulation in the 
United States.. Their suggestions were anecdotally confirmed by multiple oral communications with 
Chinese academics between Aug. 2011 and July 2012 [names withheld for protection]. For more detail, 
see infra note 138. See also ZHENG, supra note 134, at 39 (arguing that China’s unitary system displays 
intergovernmental bargaining dynamics associated with federalism even without any constitutional 
basis for federalism). 
Ryan - Final (Do Not Delete) 7/21/2014  4:29 PM 
Fall 2013]    ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 211 
political democracy and the Falungong.136 
Environmental enforcement has not yet reached this level of priority, 
though changes may be underway.137 In the meanwhile, when the central 
government sets environmental policies requiring local enforcement, 
securing the needed implementation may occasionally require additional 
efforts at persuasion.138  By whatever means, ongoing attention to this 
hurdle is required, or the gap between national policymaking and local 
implementation will continue to undermine environmental reform. 
 
D. Mechanics, Mixed Messages, and Nuance 
At the level of the actual mechanics, breakdowns between central 
policy and local implementation may reflect one of several underlying 
scenarios. It may be that some local leaders truly are so motivated by the 
need for economic development that they simply disregard central 
environmental directives when possible. Some may also be motivated by 
the associated rewards for encouraging economic development, which may 
include career advancement, profits associated with economic enterprise, 
and profits associated with development-related corruption.139  
Alternatively, it may be that the center is sending genuinely mixed 
signals to local leaders, asking them to meet new environmental targets 
 
 136.  Cohen, supra note 79, at 401.  
 137.  See Wang Alex L., supra note 30, at 381 (discussing national efforts to improve 
environmental responsiveness in local governance). 
 138.  I first learned of this possibility while sharing research on negotiated environmental 
federalism in the U.S. with international researchers. I was approached by several Sinologists who told 
me that the kind of central-peripheral bargaining I was describing also took place in China. I was 
incredulous: why would Beijing need to negotiate at all?  Can’t it just command the outcome it wants 
from provincial officials? However, these researchers suggested that the central government sometimes 
lacks the capacity to force priorities through the kinds of provincial roadblocks described here, and that 
this occasionally requires persuasion beyond the usual top-down model of policy delivery.   
  I spent the 2011–12 academic year in China attempting to study this dynamic, teaching in 
Shandong Province and traveling the country as a Fulbright lecturer. Unfortunately, I was not able to 
confirm these reports in a satisfactory academic manner. I was unable to access any official records of 
governance that might enable me to document such a pattern (and it is not clear whether any such 
records would exist, even if the pattern did). Nor did I have the opportunity to speak with governmental 
officials who could confirm it by personal experience. However, I spoke with fellow academics at 
universities around the country, many of whom anecdotally confirmed the familiar pattern of 
breakdown in environmental enforcement between central policymaking and provincial 
implementation, and the occasional need for more persuasive tactics.  See also ZHENG, supra note 134, 
at 39 (arguing that “de facto federalism” exists in China even without constitutional basis because it 
reflects “a relatively institutionalized pattern which involves an explicit or implicit bargain between the 
center and the provinces, one element in the bargain being that the provinces receive certain 
institutionalized or ad hoc benefits in return for guarantees by provincial officials that they will behave 
in certain ways on behalf of the center”). 
 139.  See Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 171; Wang Mingyuin, supra note 28, at 246. 
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while also asking them to meet the same economic development targets set 
before environmental regulation.140 Where the targets conflict, local leaders 
are left to sort out for themselves which policy should take precedence—
and they may try to interpret what the center most wants based on how they 
are rewarded career-wise.141 Of course, both scenarios could also be 
playing out simultaneously.142 
Despite working generalizations about local breakdowns in 
environmental enforcement, other scholars remind us that the truth is more 
nuanced. Noting that some provinces have adopted innovative measures to 
protect the environment, law professors Robert Percival and Zhao Huiyu 
admonish that: 
[T]he idea that local officials subvert the central leadership’s good 
intentions” on environmental issues has become a “familiar narrative in 
Chinese politics” but one that it is important to approach with a good 
degree of nuance. A survey of Chinese NGOs reports that NGOs leaders 
have a more positive opinion of local leaders than the general public in 
China. Local efforts to protect economically important industries in 
China are real, but it is too simplistic “to call the central government pro-
environment and the local government pro-growth.143  
For example, Shenzhen is leading in experimentation with carbon markets, 
and others have led elsewhere.144  
 That some provinces and municipalities have proven to be 
environmental innovators is a hopeful sign. Notwithstanding important 
differences between the Chinese and American governance, it is 
reminiscent of an important strength of regulatory dynamism within 
American environmental law—itself a story of exchange between national 
and state leadership at various points in U.S. history.145 But as yet, the story 
remains a work in progress, and environmental innovations by some 
national and local leaders will not meet with full success until they are 
consistently implemented nationwide. 
 
 140.  See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 111 (“There are, though, formidable obstacles facing 
proponents of rapidly cutting China’s emissions. Robust economic growth remains imperative for 
leaders, who fear that slowing growth and rising joblessness would imperil the Communist Party’s rule. 
China remains dependent on coal, the source of about 70 percent of the country’s energy. And officials 
and companies in China are likely to resist steps they fear could jeopardize their industrial 
investments.”). 
 141.  See Wang Alex L., supra note 30, at 380–81. 
 142.  Cf. Wang Mingyuin, supra note 28, at 245–46. 
 143.  Percival & Zhao, supra note 35 at 180 (citing RACHEL STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
IN CHINA: A STUDY IN POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE 232 (2013)). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See RYAN, supra note 125, at xxvii–xxviii (discussing alternating eras of federal and state 
environmental regulatory dominance, in which each took up the regulatory slack left by the other on 
matters of traditional air and water pollution law and climate governance). 
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III.  WEAK JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT 
 
Environmental enforcement problems at all levels are compounded by 
judicial failures to provide a reliable means for the victims of 
environmental harm to seek justice. Although the situation is improving, 
serious hurdles remain in the way of plaintiffs hoping to enforce the law by 
injunction or seeking compensation for their losses.146 Faithful vindication 
of environmental law by the judiciary could incentivize compliance by 
regulated entities and provide a meaningful check on enforcement failures 
by the other branches—but too often, it does not. 
This Part explores the judicial role in Chinese environmental 
enforcement, but before going further, it is important to note the different 
expectations that Western and Chinese systems hold for the judicial role.  
The Chinese system has never relied on its courts in the same way that, for 
example, the American system does. The Chinese judiciary does not 
operate independently from the other branches of government,147 and it 
does not command the same monopoly over dispute resolution associated 
with Western courts.148 Many private conflicts, including environmental 
conflicts, have historically been managed through mediation and other 
avenues of dispute resolution unassociated with the judiciary.149 After all, 
and in contrast to the statutory bias of American environmental law, much 
of China’s environmental governance flows from policy documents that do 
not create judicially enforceable rights or obligations.150  
 
 146.  Goldman, supra note 75, at 257 (noting that even though Chinese law authorizes victims to 
seek compensation for harm caused by pollution, plaintiffs often find it difficult to amass sufficient 
proof to prevail, and even when they do, “they may encounter further obstacles when seeking to collect 
damage awards”); Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 167–68, 173 (noting that environmental law reforms 
have been increasing but leave much to be desired). 
 147.  Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 176–77 (“The existing judicial management mechanism is 
principally guided by the local Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Committee and supervised by the high 
court, which is responsible for trial and personnel affairs.”). 
 148.  Stefanie Beyer, Environmental Law and Policy in the People’s Republic of China, 5 CHINESE 
J. INT’L L. 185, 189–91 (2006) (describing both the modern and traditional preference for mediation in 
Chinese dispute resolution); Jingjing Liu, Oscillating Between Court Mediation and Adjudication in 
Chinese Environmental Lawsuits – Loss of Opportunities or A Happy Ending for All?, (forthcoming 
2014) (J.S.D. dissertation describing the prominent role of mediation in environmental dispute 
resolution) (prospectus on file with journal). The local government procuratorate also participates in 
extra-judicial environmental dispute resolution through the disbursement of “stability funds” and other 
discretionary relief to assist citizen complainants independently of a formal court hearing. Email from 
Daniel Guttman to the author (Oct. 19, 2013) (on file with author). 
149. See supra note 148.1.  See Kun Fan, Glocalization of Arbitration: Transnational Standards 
Struggling with Local Norms Through the Lens of Arbitration Transplantation in China, 18 HARV. 
NEGOTIATION L. REV. 175, 187–92 (2013) (discussing the critical role of non-adversarial dispute 
resolution in both ancient and contemporary Chinese legal institutions). 
 150.  See supra notes 100–106 and accompanying text (discussing the amalgam of statute, rule, and 
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Nevertheless, and while there is much to recommend China’s long 
history of non-litigation based dispute resolution,151 even mediation takes 
place in the shadow of the relevant rules of law and policy. As 
environmental statutes designed to be judicially enforceable play an 
increasing role in Chinese environmental governance, so should genuine 
opportunities for reliable judicial enforcement.  Judicial decisions are an 
important means for defining the contours of environmental obligations and 
for securing environmental justice in disputes that cannot be mediated. 
When publicly available, judicial decisions have the potential to curb the 
behavior of prospective violators in a way that private mediation cannot, 
and to inspire better performance by implementing agencies. Moreover, to 
the extent that many environmental governance challenges are rooted in 
more general problems of patronage and corruption, nurturing the 
development of a genuinely neutral judicial arbiter could be critical.   
Indeed, the Chinese Supreme Court has recently indicated plans to 
take environmental enforcement more seriously, at least at the level of 
sentencing. New guidance issued by the Supreme Court in 2013 broke from 
past practice by opening the possibility of capital punishment for serious 
environmental crimes.152 According to the Court, the death penalty is 
appropriate for offenders who intentionally cause environmental pollution 
that results in death or enormous damage to public or private property.153  
 However, lax sentencing has not been the primary concern for 
environmental plaintiffs; more pressing are the enormous hurdles they 
experience getting into court at all. This Part reviews the substantial 
barriers to judicial review of environmental harm and the advantages of 
allowing more consistent public access. Barriers to access include problems 
of limited public interest standing, judicial discretion to refuse valid legal 
claims, and limited public viewing of trials. The results are unfortunate, 
because judicial disposition of difficult environmental cases would yield 
benefits that extend far beyond the individual interests of harmed plaintiffs.  
The consistent availability of judicial review could also provide political 
cover for officials choosing between competing economic and 
environmental targets, help bridge the gap between central policymaking 
and local implementation, and advance publicly touted goals of increasing 
public participation in governance. 
 
 
plan in Chinese law). 
 151.  See sources cited supra note 149. 
 152.  Blanchard & Roche, supra note 115 .  
 153.  Id.; translated in Email from Yuan Ye, Chinese Research Assistant, to the author (Oct. 2013) 
(on file with author). 
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A. Limited Public Interest Standing 
One barrier to environmental justice through the courts is the high 
threshold for standing to bring ordinary environmental lawsuits.154 In most 
cases, private parties may not seek judicial review of general regulatory 
decisions by the government.155 Plaintiffs must state a claim on which relief 
may be granted for a direct, individualized injury.156 However, the idea of 
allowing an organization to bring a public interest environmental suit on 
behalf of others—an important tool of environmental litigation in the 
United States—is still a new one in China.157  
Class action lawsuits have also been very limited in the past, although 
recent proposals to allow certain environmental class action suits by NGOs 
generated great hope.158 A draft amendment to the Environmental 
Protection Law in 2013 designated only one Beijing-based environmental 
law NGO as entitled to bring these suits.159  However, the monopoly this 
 
 154.  Goldman, supra note 75, at 254 (proposing that China broaden standing for lawsuits to 
compel compliance with environmental law and reflecting on how essential judicial access has been in 
fostering the prevention of environmental harm in the United States); Percival & Zhao, supra note 35, 
at 151 (describing the difficulties of pursuing environmental public interest litigation in China).  
 155.  See Percival & Zhao, supra note 35, at 164 (“Chinese law does not authorize private parties to 
seek judicial review of regulatory decisions by the State Council. In 2003 two judges in Henan province 
were fired as a result of a decision that struck down a provincial regulation as inconsistent with national 
law. This received national attention in China, providing a strong signal to other judges that aggressive 
judicial review was unwelcome in China.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 156.  Min Shi Su Song Fa [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991), art. 108, 4 P.R.C. LAWS 183, translated in Civil 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, LAW INFO CHINA, http://www.lawinfochina.com 
/display.aspx?id=6459&lib=law&SearchKeyword=civil%20procedure&SearchCKeyword= (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2013). Article 108 provides that “[t]he following conditions must be met before a lawsuit is 
filed: 
(1) The plaintiff must be a citizen, legal person, or an organization having a direct interest with the case; 
(2) There must be a specific defendant; 
(3) There must be a concrete claim, a factual basis, and a cause for the lawsuit; and 
(4) The lawsuit must be within the scope of civil lawsuits to be accepted by the people's courts and 
within the jurisdiction of the people's court to which the lawsuit is filed.”  Id. 
See also Goldman, supra note 75, at 257 (describing the difficulty meeting these standards, which are 
interpreted in ways that are stricter than U.S. standing rules, in many environmental cases); Percival & 
Zhao, supra note 35, at 170-71.   
 157.  Percival & Zhao, supra note 35, at 172-73; Wang, supra note 26, at 204–05 (discussing the 
novelty and rarity of public interest environmental lawsuits). See generally DAN GUTTMAN & XIA 
KUNBAO, UNITED NATIONS DEMOCRACY FUND, UNDEF 4TH ROUND PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT: 
“PROTECT ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND JUSTICE OF THE PUBLIC” (2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/dr7.un.org.democracyfund/files/UDF-CPR-09-320_ER.pdf 
(explaining the need for environmental public interest litigation in China and evaluating the All China 
Environment Federation as a pioneer in the field). 
 158.  See Zhao Yinan, Tougher Punishments for Polluters Proposed, CHINA DAILY (June 27, 2013, 
6:47 AM), available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-06/27/content_16667928.htm. 
 159.  Id.  
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would create fomented such public resentment that the future of the 
proposal remains unclear as this article goes to press.160 
 
B. Discretion to Decline Environmental Cases 
A more serious problem is that even when plaintiffs clearly satisfy the 
requirements of standing, courts often refuse to hear their valid 
environmental claims outright.161 According to the Civil Procedure Code, 
article 111, plaintiffs meeting the basic standing requirements set forth 
earlier in the code have a right to pursue their claims in court.162 However, 
formidable barriers of politics, ex parte influence, and limited judicial 
resources often conspire to prevent legitimate environmental plaintiffs from 
exercising their rights to judicial access.163 China’s judiciary is not 
independent,164 and judges—some of whom are not even trained as 
lawyers—are politically vulnerable for the decisions they make.165 Party 
representatives participate on judicial panels in deciding all important 
matters, including whether cases are accepted for hearing.166 
If Party leaders do not wish a claim to be heard for whatever reason, 
the court will decline to hear the case—a problem that is especially severe 
for environmental plaintiffs.167 Courts with limited resources prefer to 
 
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Xia Jun, China’s Courts Fail the Environment, CHINA DIALOGUE (Jan. 16, 2012), 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4727--China-s-courts-fail-the-environment-.  
 162.  Min Shi Su Song Fa [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991), art. 111, 4 P.R.C. LAWS 183 (China), translated 
in Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, LAW INFO CHINA, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=6459&lib=law&SearchKeyword=civil%20procedure&S
earchCKeyword= (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (“People’s courts shall accept the lawsuits filed in 
conformity with the provisions of Article 108 of this Law.”). For the standing requirements set forth in 
Article 108, see supra note 156. 
 163.  Xia, supra note 161 (citing political and corruptive influences, as well as scarce judicial 
resources, as impediments to plaintiffs’ ability to bring suit).  
 164.  Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 176–77 (“The existing judicial management mechanism is 
principally guided by the local Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Committee and supervised by the high 
court, which is responsible for trial and personnel affairs.”). 
 165.  See Marquand, supra note 81 (“For years, China's judges have been drawn from a pool of 
retired military officers with no legal background or students fresh from law school who ‘do what they 
are told,’ according to one expert who did not wish to be identified. Chinese courts do not have an 
independent judiciary that can make decisions separate from Communist Party influence.”); McCubbin, 
supra note 77, at 230 (“[M]any judges are poorly trained and unfamiliar with their responsibilities to 
enforce the law uniformly”) (internal citations omitted); see also Xia, supra note 161 (discussing judges 
refusing to take cases that may hinder economic growth out of fear of losing their jobs).  
 166.  Cf. Xia, supra note 161 (describing a court criticized by local Communist Party committee 
and local government for hearing an environmental pollution case). 
 167.  See id. (describing environmental plaintiffs’ inability to petition the courts to bring suits, 
obtain information on polluters, or otherwise enforce environmental monitoring). 
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avoid environmental cases because they are highly technical, complex, and 
time-consuming. Judges worry that allowing one claim against a defendant 
who has potentially harmed large numbers of people will only encourage 
additional plaintiffs to come forward.168 Judges are also subject to powerful 
influence from local government and party officials who hold economic 
interests in defendant enterprises. Because these officials control the 
staffing of the court and the career prospects of individual judges, it is 
difficult for judges to maintain neutrality in such cases.169 
The combined result is that many qualifying environmental claims 
never see a courtroom. For example, in 2011, a devastating oil spill took 
place off China’s northeast coast after a Conoco-Phillips oil rig ruptured in 
the Bohai Sea.170 The accident created a 320-square mile oil slick that 
damaged 2,400 miles of marine area.171 Afterward, countless qualifying 
plaintiffs attempted to bring claims for the significant losses they had 
sustained to fisheries, private property, and municipal services—but no 
private suits were allowed to be heard while the government negotiated a 
settlement with the defendants outside of court.172 The government 
settlement did provide $160 million in damages for private losses (in 
addition to $269 million awarded to the state), but this may be a fraction of 
what individual plaintiffs may have been entitled to in independently 
assessed tort damages.173 
Xia Jun, an environmental attorney practicing in Beijing, echoes 
popular sentiments about the difficulties of bringing environmental 
litigation in describing his own experiences: 
As a lawyer with a decade-long involvement in environmental rights, I 
still remember the sighs of my colleagues when I set out on this path: 
litigation is hard in China; environmental litigation doubly so. . . . 
 This is true for every stage of the process: lodging a complaint, 
 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. (“Often, cases are not heard – or are not heard fairly – because local government funds the 
court, as well as hiring and firing its staff.”).  
 170.  Andrew Jacobs, China Admits Extent of Spill from Oil Rig, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011, A4.   
 171.  Id.   
 172.  See China Sets Fines for Bohai Oil Spill, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Apr. 30, 2012, 11:32 AM), 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/04/30/China-sets-fines-for-Bohai-oil-
spill/UPI-94121335799975/ (noting the extent of the spill); Wu Xiaolei, The Battering of the Bohai, 
CHINA DIALOGUE (Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4592-The-
battering-of-the-Bohai (discussing the impact of the spill on the fishing industry and local ecosystems); 
multiple oral communications with author by environmental academics over Aug. 2011 through July 
2012 (names withheld for their protection).  
 173.  See UNITED PRESS INT’L, supra note 172 (describing the fines and penalties defendants were 
required to pay); Xia, supra note 161 (explaining that private damage awards are much more likely to 
incentivize environmental compliance than administrative sanctions, which are too low to provide a 
meaningful deterrent). 
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registering a case, assessing damages, winning the case and executing 
judgements [sic]. Each step is a battle, and no real solution has emerged. 
Perhaps most depressing is the refusal of courts to hear environmental or 
administrative lawsuits that are legally entitled to a hearing, often on the 
basis of flimsy reasoning, where a reason is given at all.174 
Xia Jun notes that administrative sanctions and fines for pollution are too 
low to meaningfully deter violations of environmental laws, but judicially-
imposed compensation for private damages has the potential to induce 
compliance by polluting industries concerned about their bottom lines.175  
 Nevertheless, he laments, too many environmental cases never make it 
into court, often for reasons of naked political interference: 
A major problem is that most courts are prone to interference from local 
government, and impartial judgements [sic] in environmental disputes 
are hard to come by. Often, cases are not heard – or not heard fairly – 
because local government funds the court, as well as hiring and firing its 
staff. 
Local governments’ love-affair with GDP growth, focus on short-term 
benefits and narrow view of what it means to maintain stability mean 
that environmental legislation lacks authority and administrative powers 
are misused. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that many 
environmental disputes fail even to make it to court.176 
He offers an example from 2005, when local government and party 
officials criticized a Chengde court that had accepted a class action 
environmental case brought by 1,500 villagers after a steel company 
polluted the local groundwater.177 With this incident in mind, a later 
maritime judge declined to allow a group of Dalian fishermen to sue for 
damages after a 2010 oil spill, explaining that “[i]f we heard the 
fishermen’s case, we would lose our jobs.”178 Xia Jun further describes his 
own years of failed attempts to get cases into court when pollution had 
caused disease and death, because judges were worried that taking one case 
would only result in more claims being filed.179 
 In one hopeful response to the difficulties accessing judicial review of 
environmental harms, China has experimented with the development of 
specialized environmental courts, dedicated to hearing environmental 
claims alone.180 In recent years, nearly one hundred such tribunals have 
 
 174.  Xia, supra note 161. 
 175.  Id. (“High compensation payouts in a number of lawsuits would cause other polluters to pay 
attention.”).  
 176.  Id.  
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Id. (discussing the connection between the two events).  
 179.  Id. (“The court was worried that the case would result in more claims being brought and so 
opted to ignore it.”).  
 180.  Rachel E. Stern, Poor Rural Residents in China Seen as Easy Target for Environmental 
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been established, raising hopes that the judiciary would finally play its part 
in enforcing China’s environmental laws.181  
 With notable exceptions in Wuxi, Guiyang, and Chongqing, however, 
the experiment has so far mostly led to disappointment.182  Caseloads have 
remained small and disproportionately focused on prosecuting poor rural 
violators for minor environmental crimes, rather than targeting large-scale 
polluters causing substantial public harm.183  Reportedly, judges remain 
reluctant “to accept cases against big taxpayers, let along rule against 
them”184—poignantly demonstrating that the same problems of political 
patronage and fears of retribution that have undermined environmental 
enforcement in the general courts are also compromising the effectiveness 
of the new environmental courts. 
 
C. Public Accountability and Limited Access to Court Proceedings 
Limited judicial review of environmental claims enables polluters and 
enforcement agencies to escape public accountability for their respective 
enforcement failures.185 These accountability problems are further 
compounded by judicial procedures that limit public viewing of even those 
matters that make it into court.  
The Civil Procedure Code specifies that court proceedings should be 
open to the public,186 but those seeking to view them in person must first 
register with the government, creating a written record of their personal 
attendance.187 The identification requirement is inherently intimidating, 
 
Lawsuits, CHINA DIALOGUE (April 24, 2013), 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5937-Poor-rural-residents-in-China-seen-as-easy-
target-for-environmental-lawsuits.  
 181.  Id.  
 182.  Id.  
 183.  Id.  
 184.  Id.  
 185.  See, e.g., Ma Jun, Transparency Test in the Bohai Sea, CHINA DIALOGUE (July 20, 2011), 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4418 (discussing public frustration over repeated 
efforts by the government to cover up environmental pollution affecting their health and livelihood). 
 186.  WEI LUO, THE CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW AND COURT RULES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 79 (2006) (“Civil cases adjudicated by people's courts shall usually be heard publicly, except for 
the cases that involve state secrets or the private affairs of individuals, or are otherwise provided by 
law.”). 
 187.  See JOSHUA D. ROSENZWEIG, DUI HUA FOUND., PROMOTING INCREASED TRANSPARENCY IN 
CHINA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, ANNEX A: PUBLIC ACCESS AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL IN 
CHINA (2009), available at http://duihua.org/wp/?page_id=2542 (“The rules in Chinese courts currently 
require prospective observers to register with an office of the court, where they present identification 
and request an ‘observer pass’ . . . that enables access to a particular hearing. Intentionally or not, this 
type of ‘gatekeeper’ system, by its very existence, restricts access and risks turning courts’ obligation to 
provide access to their proceedings into a privilege to be granted at the discretion of court employees.”). 
Ryan - Final (Do Not Delete) 7/21/2014  4:29 PM 
220 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIV:183 
dissuading otherwise interested members of the public from witnessing 
how the government responds to important matters of environmental 
management. Those who do register subject themselves to the potential for 
adverse political consequences, including harassment or retribution, if they 
show interest in litigation involving sensitive issues or parties.188 These 
procedures effectively deter public viewing and further undermine 
transparency and accountability in environmental governance. 
 
D. The Wider Advantages of Judicial Enforcement 
Chinese courts have thus played a comparatively small role in 
environmental governance, although some observers hope that the 
innovation of environmental courts will eventually succeed.189 The 
underutilization of judicial review for environmental harm is ironic, 
however, because encouraging it could yield benefits not only to the 
victims but also to the government officials coping with many of the other 
enforcement obstacles discussed previously.  
For example, reliable judicial enforcement of environmental statutes 
could ease pressure on public officials hesitant to take on politically 
powerful polluters, helping them accomplish the very environmental 
progress they are now directed to make under the Twelfth Five Year Plan. 
In one anecdotal example, local officials in a pollution-stricken 
municipality were divided on whether to prioritize the health concerns 
raised by citizens or the economic value of the local factory.190  The dispute 
was allowed to proceed to court, where it was concluded that the factory 
should be closed and relocated.191 Officials can also ask courts to back up 
controversial enforcement decisions, helping to shield them from political 
retribution.  For example, officials in Wuxi and Chongqing regularly ask 
the local environmental courts to provide judicial affirmation of risky 
enforcement decisions.192 
Examples like these reveal how judicial review of environmental 
harms can provide helpful political cover for unpopular enforcement 
actions—actions that would otherwise be attributed solely to the judgment 
of individual policymakers. The unlucky official forced to choose between 
upholding environmental directives and honoring conflicting political 
 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  See, e.g., Stern, supra note 180.  
 190.  Oral communication with author.  Because I was asked not to share identifying details about 
this story, the names of the municipality and involved parties have been withheld.   
 191.  Id. 
 192.  See Stern, supra note 180 (reporting on the use of “non-litigation administrative execution 
cases (NAECs) in which government agencies seek court enforcement of their decisions”).  
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obligations might be grateful for the realistic threat of judicial review as a 
face-saving device. By the same mechanism, consistent judicial 
enforcement could help bridge the vexing gap between central 
environmental directives and local implementation. And of course, wholly 
apart from its face-saving potential, consistent judicial enforcement could 
straightforwardly procure greater local compliance.   
Finally, allowing victims redress in open court would increase public 
participation and transparency in environmental governance, facilitating 
progress in another realm frequently singled out for criticism.193 Over the 
last decade, the State Council itself has called for increased public 
participation in several important documents, including the 2004 
“Guidelines of Comprehensively Promoting Administration by Law” and 
the 2010 “Opinions on Strengthening the Establishment of Government by 
Law.”194 Both call for greater public participation in governance to ensure 
that public rights are protected and legitimate public concerns addressed.195 
 However, the judicial access afforded to environmental plaintiffs and 
public attendees is presently too limited to accomplish these goals.  For this 
reason, the public accountability promised by public judicial hearings falls 
short of the rule of law’s true promise. 
 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 
 
As it is for so many areas of law in China, the “rule of law” problem is 
perhaps the central problem for environmental law.196 This Part reviews the 
relationship between Chinese environmental governance failures and more 
general governance challenges in China, including political patronage, 
corruption, and the limits of judicial independence.  Reflecting on the 
 
 193.  See Guttman & Xia, supra note 157, at 18–19, 20–24 (making specific recommendations for 
increased public participation in environmental governance and enforcement); Percival & Zhao, supra 
note 35, at 177-79; Tseming Yang & Xuehua Zhang, Public Participation in Environmental 
Enforcement . . . with Chinese Characteristics?: A Comparative Assessment of China’s Environmental 
Complaint Mechanism, 24 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 364–65 (2012) (advocating for greater 
transparency in environmental governance); Wenxuan Yu & Jason J. Czarnezki, Challenges to China's 
Natural Resources Conservation & Biodiversity Legislation, 43 ENVTL. LAW 125, 127 (2013) (arguing 
that China can improve lacking conservation legislation by increasing public participation and 
enforcement efforts). 
 194.  See Percival & Zhao, supra note 35, at 160-61. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  See, e.g., Richard J. Ferris Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, Reaching Out to the Rule of Law: China’s 
Continuing Efforts to Develop an Effective Environmental Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
569, 594–600 (2003) (discussing how local protectionism, the lack of transparency, private practice 
norms, implementation barriers, and limited regulatory resources all pose challenges to more effective, 
rule-of-law-based implementation of environmental laws).  
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contemporary currents of public and Party sentiment, it considers the 
resulting puzzle for genuine efforts at reform. 
 
A. “Rule of Law” vs. “Rule by Law” 
Defined, the rule of law is the ideal that all people are equal before the 
law, and governed by the law, without exception.197 The Chinese 
Constitution expressly articulates a version of the rule of law,198 and 
China’s new leadership has reinforced certain rule-of-law ideals, including 
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption admonition to officials that “no one can enjoy 
absolute power outside of the law and that anyone who exercises power 
must ‘consciously accept supervision by the people.’”199  
Yet as the subsequent arrest of anti-corruption agitators like Professor 
Xu Zhiyong suggests,200 China often provides more of an example of rule 
by law, in which law is used instrumentally as a tool for accomplishing the 
specified goals of government leadership.201 Rule by law is distinguishable 
from the rule of law, because legal rules are enforced by the government 
only insofar as they advance the political priorities of the leadership. The 
judgment of responsible officials thus trumps the letter of the law.  
Enforcement of the law is essentially viewed as a device to advance the 
overall public interest, rather than a public interest in and of itself. 
Moving toward a true rule-of-law culture in China is an enormous, 
controversial task. At every level of environmental law—policymaking, 
goal-setting, implementation, and enforcement—rule-of-law ideals are in 
direct competition with entrenched systems of political patronage.202 The 
most ambitious proposals for accomplishing rule-of-law goals involve the 
establishment of a fully independent judiciary, the dream of many Chinese 
 
 197.  See, e.g., Interview by Bob Schieffer with Madeline K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State Face 
the Nation (CBS television broadcast June 28, 1998), available at 
http://secretary.state.gov./www/statements/1998/980628.html (quoting Albright’s definition of the rule 
of law and contrasting the Chinese approach).  
 198.  See Goldman, supra note 75, at 253 (“China's entry into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) carries explicit obligations to develop a certain degree of transparency and provide legal 
remedies, at least in the commercial context.”). 
 199.  See Bi, supra note 82. 
 200.  See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
 201.  See McCubbin, supra note 77, at 230 (discussing how the rule of law is weakened when 
“[j]udges apply legal requirements inconsistently or rule in favor of entrenched political or economic 
interests because they are beholden to the local officials who pay their salaries and who pressure them 
to protect the enterprises that provide revenue for the local government”). Cf. Strengthening the Rule of 
Law for U.S. Business Interests in Russia: Hearing Before the S. Finance Comm., 112th Cong. 3–4 
(Mar. 15, 2012) (statement of Alan Larson), available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Larson%20Testimony.pdf (discussing problems 
associated with the “rule by law” approach in Russia). 
 202.  The East is Grey, ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2013, at 18.  
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lawyers and academics.203 However, this remains an unlikely prospect in 
the near future. As Professor Wang Canfa has noted, 
Reforming the judicial management mechanisms presents a difficult and 
unavoidable problem. To reform the judicial system, including the 
appointment of judges and the precedent of a court, would be to reform 
the political system.204 
There is no evidence that the Party is interested in this sort of political 
reform, and plenty to suggest that it is not. Party leadership recently 
circulated “Document No. 9,” presumably written by Xi Jinping, which 
distilled a list of the seven most subversive ideas that the Party believes are 
threatening political stability in China.205 At the top of the list: “Western 
constitutional democracy.”206 Establishing an independent judiciary raises 
exactly the specter of Western constitutional democracy that so alarms the 
Party, because it runs counter to the established structure of interdependent, 
political, and authoritarian decision-making that is the hallmark of modern 
Chinese governance.207 And while many in China are advocating for 
greater judicial independence, few are advocating revolution.208 
Document No. 9 shows that Western rule-of-law ideals have 
penetrated the Chinese discourse, but also how threatening these ideas 
appear to current Chinese leadership.209 Given this reaction, it is difficult to 
imagine a serious move toward judicial independence without tremendous 
political upheaval.  
Yet most Chinese are already exhausted by political upheaval—many 
with living memory of the convulsions of the 1949 Revolution, the 
devastation of the Great Leap Forward of the 1950s, the tragic Cultural 
 
 203.  See, e.g., Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 177–78.  
 204.  Id. at 178. 
 205.  See Chris Buckley, China Takes Aim at Western Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2013, at A1 
(describing the Party’s push-back against rule-of-law reforms); Editorial Board, China’s Half-Measure 
on the Rule of Law, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-
half-measure-on-the-rule-of-law/2013/08/22/d2ed0020-09cc-11e3-9941-
6711ed662e71_story.html?wpisrc=nl_cuzheads (“In nations that genuinely respect the rule of law, not 
even the highest officials are above the law. But China has put its Communist Party above it, and the 
party often dictates to judges, prosecutors and police.”); Editorial Board, Look Who’s Afraid of 
Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2013, at A26 (“What does Mr. Xi consider subversive? The first was 
‘Western constitutional democracy,’ feared because it would put the Communist Party under the rule of 
law, not above it.”). 
 206.  Look Who’s Afraid of Democracy, supra note 205.  
 207.  See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (describing the structure of Chinese 
governance).  
 208.  Elizabeth J. Perry, Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?, 57 CHINA J. 8–9 
(2007). 
 209.  Stanley Lubman, Document No.9: The Party Attacks Western Democratic Ideals, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 27, 2013, 12:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/08/27/document-no-9-the-party-
attacks-western-democratic-ideals/. 
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Revolution of the 1960s, the momentous Deng Xiaoping reforms of the late 
1970s and 1980s, the violence of the Tiananmen Square retrenchment in 
1989, and the bone-rattling transition of recent decades toward a market 
economy. Almost nobody that I hear from in China is advocating for 
sudden change if the cost is further political turmoil. Nearly every one of 
the people who entrusted me with their earnest views advocated for paced, 
moderate change. No more revolution, they pleaded. China must change, 
they said, but change must come more slowly. 
The appetite for upheaval is equally low among government elites. In 
China, it is common wisdom that the top priority of Party leadership is 
maintaining social stability (and as the Tiananmen incident demonstrated, it 
is willing to do so at extraordinary cost).210 Until now, the government’s 
calculation has been that increasing living standards through economic 
development was the key to continued stability. However, growing public 
frustration over the Airpocalypse and other environmental harm is 
changing that calculation.211 Though environmental activism was long 
considered “safe” in comparison to political activism challenging more 
sensitive matters of governance (such as limits on freedom of speech, 
religion, or Tibetan nationalism),212 such activism increasingly represents 
its own threat to social stability.213 Indeed, one reason the government has 
responded more quickly to the demands of recent environmental protesters 
is because it understands that public anger over environmental policies 
could lead to deeper and more open social unrest.214 
 
 210.  See Gillian Wong, China Seeks to Stem Environmental Protests, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 12, 
2012), http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/2012/11/12/china-seeks-stem-environmental-
protests/q6QzZ2S5obq7ff8V9StlUN/story.html (“The Chinese government will require that future 
industrial projects include assessments of their risk to social stability, following several large protests 
around the country over pollution, a top official said Monday.”); China Emphasizes Maintaining 
Stability During the Tiananmen 20 Year Anniversary, CHINASCOPE (Aug. 10, 2009), 
http://chinascope.org/m/content/view/1643/109/ (“The Hong Kong China News Agency reported that 
all mainland media remained mute during the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre. Chinese 
officials promoted maintaining social stability (Editor’s Note: that translates as no protests or petitions) 
to keep June 4 quiet.”). See also 1989: Massacre in Tiananmen Square, BBC, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/4/newsid_2496000/2496277.stm (last visited Dec. 
20, 2013) (reporting on the events of the day). 
 211.  See Buckley, supra note 205. 
 212.  See Percival & Zhao, supra note 35, at 151 (“Theoretically, environmental NGOs create less 
political sensitivity than other NGOs in the view of Chinese government officials. NGOs that focus on 
human rights, labor and other issues are viewed as potentially more threatening by Chinese officials.”).  
 213.  See Wong, supra note 20, at A12 (noting that environmental enforcement “is often a weak 
point, even when leaders understand that cleaning up the environment has become critical to 
maintaining social and political stability”). 
 214.  Buckley, supra note 111 (“[P]ublic anger about noxious air has jolted the government, which 
long dismissed pollution as the necessary price of prosperity. . . . The widespread ire about air pollution 
has forced China’s new leadership to vow firmer, faster measures for cleaner air that are likely to 
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B. The Political Puzzle for Reform 
The resulting mix of concerns represents a political puzzle for both the 
Chinese people and their leaders.  
Ordinary citizens, afraid to let their children play outside because of 
bad air quality, want immediate changes to protect public health and 
safety.215 Yet for average people, levers of public participation in Chinese 
governance are limited. They rely on the government to lead them in the 
direction of change and are generally uninterested in challenging its 
authority (indeed, most are proud nationalists).216 But when the government 
fails to lead them in the direction they desire, the people have few means of 
effecting their goals in a closed political system where dissenting views are 
suppressed in the press, on the Internet, and in elections.217 They lack 
reliable judicial access to air grievances and seek redress.218 Even though 
they do not want a revolution, thousands of people are turning out for 
potentially dangerous environmental protests because it is the only way 
they know to be heard.219 
Meanwhile, a government that values social stability above all is faced 
with growing unrest over environmental harm. Document #9 reveals that 
Party leaders are not interested in political reforms that would weaken 
central authority—for example, by establishing an independent judiciary 
that could overturn central directives.220 But central authority has so far 
 
reduce carbon dioxide output, especially from coal, experts said. ‘The public concern about the air 
pollution has helped raise awareness about broader environmental problems,’ said Mr. Jiang, a 
researcher at the Energy Research Institute, which advises the Chinese government.”). But see John 
Copeland Nagle, How Much Should China Pollute?, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 591, 628 (2011) (“The 
government’s prosecution of environmental activists, and its desire to maintain control above all else, 
hinders any serious attempt to control the massive amounts of pollution that have produced an 
environmental crisis in China. Those actions also threaten the very stability that China craves.”).  
 215.  See Edward Wong, In China, Breathing Becomes a Childhood Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
2013, at A1 (“Levels of deadly pollutants up to 40 times the recommended exposure limit in Beijing 
and other cities have struck fear into parents and led them to take steps that are radically altering the 
nature of urban life for their children. Parents are confining sons and daughters to their homes, even if it 
means keeping them away from friends. Schools are canceling outdoor activities and field trips. Parents 
with means are choosing schools based on air-filtration systems, and some international schools have 
built gigantic, futuristic-looking domes over sports fields to ensure healthy breathing.”). 
 216.  See generally PETER HAYS GRIES, CHINA’S NEW NATIONALISM: PRIDE, POLITICS, AND 
DIPLOMACY (2005) (describing the emergence of a renewed patriotism and nationalism in Chinese 
popular and political culture). 
 217.  Cf. Wong, supra note 123, at A9 (detailing steps Chinese government has taken to curb 
criticism of the government on social media). 
 218.  See Xia, supra note 161 (blaming lack of access to the courts and economic reasons for the 
difficulty in bringing environmental lawsuits). 
 219.  See Yang, supra note 1, at 146 (noting the increase in protest and upheavals). 
 220.  See Buckley, supra note 205 (describing the regime’s concern over losing power and the 
reaction of top party officials to calls for constitutionalism).  
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failed to curb the short-term self-interested behavior of officials who 
continue to subordinate environmental concerns to others, fueling public 
unrest. Politically connected polluters continue to evade enforcement. 
Many local governments continue to prioritize economic development over 
centrally-mandated environmental protection. Judges continue to dodge 
environmental cases for lack of resources, to avoid crossing their political 
patrons, and for fear of opening the floodgates. Beijing has reacted by 
trying even harder to assert control, but perhaps too broadly—over both the 
recalcitrant officials who disobey its policies and the public dissidents who 
critique it—further fueling social unrest. 
Some policymakers are attempting to steer the ship of state toward 
better environmental governance, but the ship is so enormous (and so 
stymied in the weeds of political patronage) that progress can be hard to 
discern. As one Chinese law professor told me, the government 
periodically makes an example of disciplining a corrupt official for self-
dealing, but it is not enough to deter corruption by others because of 
China’s enormous population. There are simply so many self-dealing 
officials that the likelihood any one will be singled out for punishment is 
too low to overcome the overwhelming incentives to remain plugged into 
the status quo grid of personal and political favors.221 As a result, even 
high-profile disciplinary actions by the Party have so far failed to dent the 
system, and public confidence in government continues to decline.222 
To summarize the obvious, then, everybody wants social stability and 
nobody wants a revolution. The public wants more environmental 
protection, but targets are sporadically implemented and regulations 
enforced too poorly to deter wrongdoing. To maintain order, the central 
government is showing greater interest in environmental governance, but 
 
 221.  See Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Deciphering the Hidden Rules That Tempt China’s Officials, INT’L 
N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2012, 2:22 AM), http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/deciphering-
the-hidden-rules-that-tempt-chinas-officials/ (“Increasingly, some Chinese officials are saying: It’s O.K. 
to be a little bit corrupt, when others are so much more corrupt than you. The unusual self-defense by 
some public servants – corruption is unequivocally a crime in China – is featuring more and more in 
Chinese media reports, sparking wide debate in a country where the prime minister says corruption is so 
bad it could one day ‘terminate’ Communist Party rule . . . . The ‘hidden rules’ that Mr. Liu referred to 
are called ‘qian guize’ and are a well known, unofficial code for illegal behavior that ranges from minor 
rule-bending to amassing large amounts of ill-gotten gains. While the government stoutly opposes 
corruption in public, Mr. Liu’s self-defense is increasingly common, the Procuratorial Daily’s Justice 
Net noted . . . citing several other recent cases where officials sentenced for corruption said what they 
made was nothing compared to others.”); see also Wen, supra note 77. 
 222.  One example of a high profile disciplinary action that has done little to restore faith in 
government is the sensational conviction of former party leader, Bo Xilai. See John Sudworth, Chinese 
Court Rejects Bo Xilai Appeal and Upholds Life Sentence, BBC (Oct. 25, 2013, 2:55 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-24652525 (discussing the outcome of the Bo Xilai trial). 
For more on the Bo Xilai scandal, see supra note 80. 
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China is immense and hard to control from the center. Local governments 
want continued economic growth and many prioritize it despite central 
efforts at environmental reform. Too many officials at all levels of 
government are enmeshed in a self-sustaining network of economic 
incentives and political patronage that ferociously resists all attempts to 
overcome it. This network facilitates environmental enforcement lapses 
that further fuel public anger, but the network is so entrenched that it is 
difficult to imagine dismantling it without massive political upheaval. But 
to reiterate, nobody wants that. Where to go from here? 
One possible answer is that political power is so misplaced, or 
corruption so entrenched, or public safety so threatened that change must 
come at whatever cost—even if it requires political upheaval. Yet while the 
human suffering resulting from pollution in China cannot be understated, 
neither can the massive suffering that has attended the multiple points of 
political upheaval in modern Chinese history. For those who still remember 
the mass violence of land reform after the 1949 Revolution, the famines 
following the Great Leap Forward, and the killings and social upheaval 
during the Cultural Revolution—Tiananmen barely registers as tragedy.  
It is eminently reasonable that today’s Chinese shrink from further 
such tumult. The Party deserves credit for lifting millions from poverty in a 
remarkably short time, and most Chinese are justifiably proud of the 
government that led them in doing so. But by all accounts, the current 
leadership seems unlikely to relinquish authority to an independent 
judiciary without revolution, and so those who long for change must seek a 
more incremental path. 
 
V. A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR INCREMENTAL CHANGE 
 
With these complexities in mind, I conclude this article by offering 
one possible vision of what that incremental judicial reform could look 
like, based on primary research among Chinese law professors, lawyers, 
and average citizens. The proposal is not specific to environmental 
concerns and would benefit rule-of-law goals more generally. However, it 
would especially facilitate environmental reform because of the untapped 
potential benefits of increased judicial participation in environmental 
governance. Further, because the proposed change is so modest, it stands a 
chance of being enacted where more ambitious proposals might not.  It is 
the kind of incremental adjustment that government insiders seeking reform 
could propose without attracting too much resistance from the opponents of 
change, who might not view so small a change as a threat. 
In a nutshell, the proposal is simply to give genuine force to two 
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aforementioned Chinese laws that are already on the books, but poorly 
enforced: (1) guaranteed access to the courts when a plaintiff legitimately 
states a claim,223 and (2) unfettered public viewing of trials and 
appeals.224 Doing so would curtail judicial tendencies to avoid politically 
awkward cases and reduce the threat of political consequences for 
interested parties who must currently register with authorities to view court 
hearings. Beyond that, however, the judicial system would proceed as 
before, without requiring additional Western due process. The simple 
mechanism of allowing claims to be heard in court before a public audience 
creates just enough accountability to gradually shift the political 
calculations that go into judicial decision-making—and no more. It creates 
a foothold for the champions of reform without excessively provoking 
opponents, but one that, over time, could meaningfully alter the culture of 
expectations regarding law enforcement. 
 
A. Step One: Guaranteed Judicial Access 
The first prong of the proposal is to simply uphold the Civil Procedure 
Code’s promise that all legitimate plaintiffs should get their day in court.225 
In its most modest form, the proposal seeks no further guarantees about the 
kind of due process that an American court would require—there is no 
additional requirement of a neutral arbiter or evidence-based rulings that 
could incite the anxieties underlying Document #9. 
The proposal simply requires a genuine public hearing of the variety 
that average court cases receive in China. This would enable plaintiffs with 
meritorious claims the chance to seek legal redress, but more importantly, 
the chance to be heard. Even if judges rule against their claims, the losing 
plaintiffs would experience the dignity of airing their grievance in a court 
of law, before their peers and those they believe caused them harm, as 
citizens of equal value with all others. The very act of participating in the 
judicial process has the potential to strengthen public faith in the rule of 
law more generally, especially if the process is perceived as fair.226 
To be sure, opening the courts to all legitimate cases could create big 
day-to-day changes for judicial administration. Confirming the concerns of 
judges who decline environmental cases for reasons of workload, the 
 
 223.  See supra notes 161–184and accompanying text. 
 224.  See supra notes 185–196 and accompanying text.   
 225.  See Min Shi Su Song Fa [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991), art. 108, 4 P.R.C. LAWS 183 (setting forth 
standing requirements). 
 226.  Marquand, supra note 81 (discussing reforms to make the judiciary a ‘safety valve’ where 
citizens can air their grievances). 
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change could substantially increase their dockets and potentially require 
additional judicial appointments. It could provoke the development of more 
stringent gatekeeping jurisprudence, such as the standing, mootness, and 
ripeness doctrines that the U.S. Supreme Court developed before it 
controlled its own docket.  Nevertheless, on the index of political 
challenge, this change would probably prove the easier of the two elements 
of the proposal. After all, implementation would not require the 
amendment of any official statutes or policies; doing so would simply 
enforce the law as it already stands. 
Moreover, the change itself would not directly threaten those who 
must make the decision to implement it—a feature that immeasurably 
increases the chance that any proposed change in governance gets made. 
Reversing the practice of disallowing qualifying claims in court does not 
change Party oversight of judicial outcomes, preserving its supervision 
over all aspects of Chinese governance. It does not change the method for 
deciding cases. Because few party leaders would have a direct stake in 
opposing the change, it should meet with mild opposition from all but the 
trial judges that may end up with more work (a problem that could be 
managed with additional staffing).  
At worst, officials with ties to defendant enterprises may foresee the 
potential for awkward judicial calls that could once have been obviated by 
ignoring the case entirely. Still, because the change would be made 
prospectively and independently of any particular case, policymakers 
behind this particular veil of ignorance would not perceive a direct threat to 
their own personal interests. 
 
B. Step Two: Unfettered Public Viewing 
The second prong is what gives the proposal the chance to truly effect 
change over time. As aforementioned, the law already protects the right of 
the public to view cases, but would-be viewers are required to identify 
themselves by name to courthouse officials. This part of the proposal 
requires the government to allow people to attend court hearings without 
having to register with the local officials who may wield significant power 
over their lives.227 Consistent with the Civil Procedure Code, this 
requirement would not apply to those matters implicating state secrets that 
are already exempted from Article 111’s open hearings requirement.228 
 
 227.  See supra notes 185–196 and accompanying text.  
 228.  Civil Procedure Law art. 66, translated in Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, LAW INFO CHINA, http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=6459&lib=law 
&SearchKeyword=civil%20procedure&SearchCKeyword= (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (“Evidence 
shall be presented in the court and cross-examined by parties, however, evidence that involves state 
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However, it would apply to all hearings that are already open to public 
view, though currently subject to the intimidating registration requirement.  
Successful implementation of this prong would require that courts not 
simply replace the registration requirement with other means of 
intimidation, but registration is perhaps uniquely intimidating.  Being 
identified carries with it an implicit threat: if the government knows you 
are interested in a subject the government wishes you were not, there may 
be unpleasant ramifications.229 People are nervous that irritating 
government officials may result in retaliation of some kind—at work, if 
they work for the state or a state-owned enterprise; in their homes, which 
are almost always built on land owned by the government; or even by 
politically-motivated detention.230 If credibly carried out, removing the 
ominous experience of officially signaling interest in potentially sensitive 
cases would increase the number of public attendees. Increasing the 
number of public attendees at trials would open a small window of 
transparency in a very small corner of Chinese governance, but even a 
cracked window beckons fresh air.  Attendees would likely use the 
ferociously popular Chinese microblogs to spread word of what they see. 
Allowing unfettered public viewing would not subject judicial 
decision-making to direct democracy, but it would open it to public 
appreciation or critique (however fleeting, in the censored blogosphere). 
Such transparency could enable just enough public accountability to 
gradually but eventually steer governmental impulses toward rule-of-law 
ideals that will inspire public faith. Public viewing would not necessarily 
change individual judicial outcomes, nor the process by which outcomes 
are determined behind the scenes. However, if observers bear witness to 
judicially-imposed perceived injustice, it will impact public opinion in a 
way that could create political consequences for the responsible officials 
and their social networks. Transparency would at least harness the self-
interest of judges in the right direction, putting the consequences of public 
reaction into the mix of considerations—from genuine legal principles to 
pure political patronage—on which their decisions are based. 
The government might respond quickly to censor unfavorable reports, 
but the government is also responsive to public unrest. The judicial 
committee that decides each case would now have to take the potential for 
 
secrets, trade secrets, or individual privacy shall not be presented in an open court session.”). 
 229.  For a recent example, consider the politically motivated prosecution of the relatives of Chen 
Guangcheng, the blind lawyer-activist who sought shelter in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing in 2012. Keith 
B. Richburg, Chen Guangcheng’s Nephew Found Guilty of Assault in China; Sentenced to 39 Months, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-30/world/35584589 
_1_shandong-officials-chen-guangcheng-chen-guangfu. 
 230.  See id.  
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public backlash into its calculations. The hope is that this feedback loop of 
marginal accountability would initiate a process by which the system 
gradually and eventually self-corrects. Sensitive to the potential for social 
unrest, decision-makers could moderate the likelihood that wrongdoing 
goes unpunished. Policymakers could also use public reactions to matters 
in court as cover for politically difficult decisions about conflicting 
environmental and economic values.231 Ideally, the simple shift in 
transparency becomes the thin edge of a wedge that grows gradually 
thicker over time, toward greater public accountability in governance more 
generally. 
The second prong of the proposal would produce smaller impacts on 
day-to-day judicial operations than the first, but allowing unfettered 
judicial access requires a change in governance culture that may ultimately 
prove the more politically difficult of the two. In China, the state asserts an 
unquestioned right to keep track of its citizens’ activities.232 Mail, 
electronic communications, and residency are all unapologetically 
scrutinized by the Chinese government.233 Other forms of personal 
surveillance, from ubiquitous surveillance cameras to CCP “monitors” in 
localities, government offices, places of business, and even universities, are 
the norm.234 It might be difficult to persuade the government not to take 
names at the door, and even more difficult to persuade members of the 
public that their attendance at public trials would not be monitored and 
potentially punished regardless of the official line. 
China’s ubiquitous surveillance programs would provide another 
means of identifying participants, so the proposal would require a credible 
governmental pledge not to collect this data for the purpose of 
 
 231.  See Email from Dan Guttman to the author, supra note 100 (describing an anecdotal example 
of this). 
 232.  As the state department warned us when we arrived in Beijing, “there are no reasonable 
expectations of privacy in China.” See Ann Bartow, When Greed Pushes Privacy Levers: Online 
Surveillance versus Economic Development in the People’s Republic of China, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1) (contextualizing China’s ongoing effort to reconcile extensively 
monitoring its citizens’ communications with its goal of developing banking and financial industries, 
high tech innovation capabilities, and the knowledge economy). 
 233.  Frank Langfitt, In China Beware: A Camera May Be Watching You, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 
29, 2013, 3:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/01/29/170469038/in-china-beware-a-camera-may-be-
watching-you (“China is becoming a surveillance state. In recent years, the government has installed 
more than 20 million cameras across a country where a decade ago there weren't many. Today, in 
Chinese cities, cameras are everywhere: on highways, in public parks, on balconies, in elevators, in 
taxis, even in the stands at sporting events. Officials say the cameras help combat crime and maintain 
‘social stability’ –  a euphemism for shutting up critics. In fact, the government routinely uses cameras 
to monitor and intimidate dissidents. Human rights activists worry that more surveillance will erode the 
freedom of ordinary people and undermine what little ability they have to question their rulers.”). 
 234.  Id. 
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intimidation.235 Nevertheless, even video-surveillance at the courthouse 
door would likely exert less intimidation than the requirement to directly 
identify oneself in paperwork retained by the government. Video-
identification requires later efforts to identify attendees from grainy 
photography, an investment of resources that might never take place.  
Besides, members of the public are so used to video-surveillance by now 
that its use in court may not provoke undue anxiety.  After all, surveillance 
at the many sites of recent mass environmental protests did not discourage 
attendance.  There is usually safety in numbers, and some have creative 
deployed the surgical masks that are now regular apparel for those seeking 
additional protection from air pollution. Either way, any form of 
surveillance that intimidates public viewing should be discouraged.   
The encouragement of greater public access to court hearings is 
consistent with the government’s recent emphasis on increasing public 
participation in environmental governance and all governance more 
generally. The Environmental Impact Assessment Law requires the state to 
encourage relevant entities, experts, and the general public to participate in 
assessment of actions that might impact their environment.236 The Law of 
Administrative Approval requires administrative agencies to inform the 
relevant parties and provide them an opportunity to share their concerns 
when certain proposed actions could affect their interests.237 The Law on 
Legislation provides that “[i]n the process of drafting an administrative 
regulation, the drafting body shall gather opinions from a wide circle of 
constituents such as the relevant agencies, organizations and citizens.”238 
Even the State Council—at the apex of the pyramid of government 
policy—has expressly sought avenues for greater public participation and 
accountability in governance.239 There is thus hope that the government 
might be willing to make the adjustment, even though it departs from past 
practice. 
 
C. The Mechanics of Transparency and Accountability 
The mechanics here are simple, and this is hardly the only way 
forward.  Expert Chinese advocates have proposed more ambitious changes 
 
 235.  Query whether similar conversations should be taking place in the United States, given the 
growth of American surveillance culture and new electronic means of data collection. 
 236.  See Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 172 (discussing Article 5). 
 237.  Id. at 178 (discussing Article 36). 
 238.  See Percival & Zhao, supra note 35, at 160–61 (discussing Article 58 and noting that public 
involvement may be sought through panel discussions, feasibility study meetings, hearings, and other 
means).   
 239.  See id. at 12, 17 (discussing the primacy of the CCP alongside State Council’s aspiration of 
increased public participation in the political process).  
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that deserve serious attention. These include restructuring enforcement 
agencies to create greater political independence from local 
governments,240 establishing greater judicial independence through vertical 
management to avoid local protectionism,241 and shifting the primary 
accounting tool of the Chinese bureaucrat from the “gross domestic 
product” to a “green domestic product” that includes the economically 
quantifiable costs and benefits of decisions affecting the environment.242 
The more modest proposal need not stand in the way of more ambitious 
reforms; ideally, they should proceed simultaneously.  
Yet modesty is perhaps the proposal’s principle virtue: because it is so 
small, there is a chance of its adoption even if the others prove too 
controversial. In simplest form, it merely ensures that people get to tell the 
government about their grievances, and that everyone else gets to see what 
the government does in response.  Beyond that, the government still gets to 
respond however it wants, within the network of consultation and 
coordination that characterizes Chinese judicial administration. As modest 
as it is, it could just prove the kernel of change that helps propel Chinese 
governance toward more transparent and accountable rule of law.   
After all, the proposal is designed to inject just enough transparency 
into the system to harness the synthesis between the public’s interest in 
environmental affairs and the government’s sensitivity to social unrest over 
environmental affairs. It leverages public environmental concern against 
the Party’s renewed commitment to greater public participation in 
governance. It focuses on court reform though courts currently play a 
relatively small role in environmental governance, but it appropriately 
tracks the increased focus on judicially enforceable environmental statutes 
and regulations.  
More generally, it asks for the minimal necessary amount of change to 
facilitate a natural process by which governance bends toward greater 
public accountability within the rule of law. Critically, it does so without 
imposing a fully Western model of due process to which the Party is openly 
hostile. If adopted, it could help initiate the kind of gradual, evolutionary 
transition away from political patronage without the political friction that 
led to the Tiananmen violence in 1989. 
In this regard, the proposal shares important features with the 
government’s new 2014 requirement that 15,000 factories disclose their air 
 
 240.  See Wang Canfra, supra note 3, at 174–75 (describing positive outlook on recent reforms that 
divorce administrative agency action from county party interference).  
 241.  Id. at 177. 
 242.  Id. at 175–76. 
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and water pollution discharges in real time.243 The theory underlying the 
celebrated reporting requirement is that transparency and public 
accountability will produce better environmental results, by curbing 
polluter behavior directly and by limiting the interference of political 
patronage in enforcement decisions. When everyone can know what 
factories are actually doing (and local observers can identify false 
reporting), the potential for public wrath will influence the cost-benefit 
analysis undertaken by regulated parties and regulators alike. Polluters 
must fear public backlash, and it becomes more expensive for officials to 
turn a blind eye to clear violations, even when they might prefer to protect 
their guanxi. 
The judicial reforms proposed here operate from the same principles. 
The two reform measures similarly harness transparency and accountability 
to produce better environmental results, here by curbing polluter and 
judicial behavior. If everyone could know about environmental harms and 
how the government responds to them, the influence of public opinion 
would become part of the cost-benefit analysis that is a defining feature of 
the hybrid judicial/political decision-making by Chinese courts. Polluters 
would have to fear public backlash, and it would be that much harder for 
executive and judicial officials to prioritize their personal guanxi.   
The pollution reporting requirement brilliantly taps into the potential 
for public accountability to overcome the hurdles of political patronage.244  
A move toward greater judicial transparency could do the same thing, and 
potentially promise even more. By reducing the successfulness of 
patronage networks, it could encourage the development of overall judicial 
norms away from the judicial/political hybrid model and toward more self-
sustaining, rule-of-law consistent judicial neutrality. 
 
D. Political Feasibility 
Long discussions with Chinese colleagues over the years have elicited 
reactions to the idea ranging from “too small” to “too big.” Some suggested 
that if one were really going to attempt reforms of this nature, why not just 
aim for judicial independence? Conversely, if the Party is unwilling to 
embrace judicial independence, why would it accept these changes, 
knowing that they are aiming for a similar goal over time? These criticisms 
are both fair; it is a small proposal, and it does have big ambitions. But 
those who admired the proposal saw strength in its realistic assessment of 
 
 243. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing China’s new requirement of public 
pollution disclosures).  
 244. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
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the mechanisms and possibilities for political reform. For them, its 
principal draw is that it the proposed changes are just small enough to be 
actually implemented in the foreseeable future, and just meaningful enough 
to trigger recursive governmental self-regulation.  
While the proposal somewhat compromises open political control of 
individual disputes, the compromise is marginal because judicial outcomes 
will still be subject to political oversight, through Party representation on 
judicial panels. However, the displacement of political influence to its 
behind-the-scenes role in judicial adjudication may prove attractive to 
government leadership because of the subsidiary benefits of judicial 
enforcement discussed in Part III(D).245 More consistent and publicly 
known judicial review could provide face-saving political cover for 
government officials prioritizing environmental directives over competing 
economic concerns and political obligations.  It could also help central 
leadership more effectively corral recalcitrant local officials, closing the 
gap of local implementation that has thus far bedeviled effective 
environmental governance.  
Most importantly, the proposal dovetails conveniently with the power 
struggles presently underway within China’s leadership.246 Though a 
unitary system, the Chinese government is not a unitary voice—like any 
other, it represents a tangled web of diverging interests and impulses, with 
some officials campaigning for greater political reforms and others 
favoring retrenchment.247 Given China’s famously black-box style of 
governance, these machinations are rarely apparent to observers. But 
factions vie for influence within the box, each imagining a different best 
path forward.248 Against this backdrop, some leaders will indeed resist the 
thin edge of what they fear could become a thick wedge—but others will 
seek out the fledgling wedge. These reformers will seek opportunities to 
introduce it in the modest, incrementally important ways suggested here. 
Generational differences will also cleave the government more 
powerfully as time moves forward.249 Especially among those born after the 
 
 245.  See supra, textual discussion accompanying note 192. 
 246.  See Tania Branigan, Where Next for China as the New Generation of Leaders Take Power?, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2012, 9:21 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/29/china-18th-
communist-party-congress-xi-jinping (describing power struggles past and present within CCP 
leadership). 
 247.  See id. 
 248.  Id.  
 249.  See id. (“Others hope a new generation of leaders could yet grasp the nettle. They are 
‘collectively more diverse in terms of their professional and political backgrounds, more weathered and 
adaptable from their formative experiences during the Cultural Revolution and more cosmopolitan in 
their worldviews and policy choices than the preceding generations. They may contribute, in a profound 
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Deng Xiaoping reforms, the thirst for change is strong. These younger 
Chinese have no personal memories of the Great Leap Forward or the 
Cultural Revolution. Fluent with Internet exchange and comfortable with 
prosperity, they have less fear of tumult and more appetite for political 
reform.250 A proposal like this one might be embraced by those seeking a 
modest way forward without risking too much political capital or social 
instability. 
This closing point reminds me of one of my most memorable 
conversations in China, with a particularly bright graduate student.  He 
explained to me his complete faith that political change would come 
eventually and without revolution, through natural transitions in leadership. 
I pressed why it was so clear that change would follow leadership 
transitions, if the outgoing leaders will just seek to replace themselves with 
new leaders who share their worldview. He agreed that it was likely that 
outgoing leaders would attempt to solidify their positions through selective 
transition. But after a moment of thoughtful silence, he added: “Yet they 
can only choose from among us.” 251 
His point was that, even with his entire generation to choose from, the 
current leaders could not simply replace themselves. What they represent 
cannot be found among the young people. Some in his generation lean left 
and some lean right, but none sees the world exactly as the aging leadership 
does. The new generation has a worldview all its own, informed by their 
experiences of greater economic development than their parents ever knew, 
the Internet, and environmental degradation. All are yearning for something 
just a little bit different, something more responsive to the public, 
something a little closer to the rule of law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
China’s leaders are taking important steps to facilitate the 
development of a regulatory culture in which effective environmental 
governance can take hold. Enforcement remains the weak link in the chain, 
 
way, to political institutionalisation and democratic governance of the country,’ argued analyst Cheng 
Li of the Brookings Institution in a recent paper on the handover.”).  
 250.  See Martin Patience, China Factory Construction Halted Amid Violent Protests, BBC (July 3, 
2012, 5:30 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18684895 (describing how students 
organized a notable protest in Shifang using their weibo accounts); Xu Nan, Traditional Media Helps 
Prevent Violent Environmental Protest in China, CHINA DIALOGUE (June 24, 2013), 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6128-Traditional-media-helps-prevent-violent-environmental-
protest-in-China/en (providing further detail about the student weibo traffic preceding the Shifang 
protests).  
 251.  Oral communication with author [name withheld for protection]. 
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but for this very reason, it also offers the lowest-hanging fruit for 
environmental reform. 
A variety of opportunities are within easy reach to substantially 
improve the environment and better protect public health and safety. 
Whether by modest improvements in judicial accountability or a full 
governance overhaul toward green GDP accounting, the goals of 
environmental enforcement are clear. Violations must be consistently 
prosecuted, policies must be consistently implemented, and victims must 
have consistent access to judicial redress, within full public view.  
Ultimately, in China and elsewhere, the success of environmental 
governance will require social change from the bottom up, shifting cultural 
norms toward sustainability.  But along that journey, it will also require 
effective enforcement from the top down. As so painfully learned by 
Beijing residents during the record-breaking Airpocalypse and by Shanghai 
residents as thousands of pig carcasses were pulled from their drinking 
water source, law without enforcement is a paper tiger. 
 
ADDENDUM 
 
On April 24, 2014, just as this article was going to press, the 
Chinese legislature passed a sweeping series of amendments to the Chinese 
Environmental Protection Law—the first since the law’s enactment twenty-
five years ago.252 According to official government reports, these changes 
reflect the fact that China has “‘declared war’ against pollution and pledged 
to fight it with the same determination the country battled poverty.”253 Four 
drafts of the amendments were reviewed before passage—an unusually 
high number that suggests both the importance and controversial nature of 
the new terms, which go into effect on January 1, 2015.254 Some make clear 
that the government is finally responding to environmental enforcement 
criticisms such as those raised in this Article.   
The amended law includes twenty-three additional articles, 
merging well-worn elements with others that show hopeful signs of 
improvement.  Familiar moves include amendments that impose stiffer 
penalties to deter environmental wrongdoing and promises that 
environmental violators will be “named and shamed” and held criminally 
 
252 Xinhua, China’s Legislature Adopts Revised Environmental Protection Law, XINHUANET (April 24, 
2014), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/24/c_133287570.htm).   
253 Id. See also Erin Ryan, The Paper Tiger Gets Teeth: Developments in Chinese Environmental 
Law, LAW.COM NETWORK (April 28, 2013) (republished in THE HUFFINGTON POST, April 30, 2014, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erin-ryan/chinese-environmental-law_b_5234210.html).  Some material 
from this addendum also appears there. 
254 Xinhua, supra note 252. 
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responsible where appropriate.255 Harsher penalties do suggest that the 
government is taking environmental harm more seriously, but as argued 
above, threatening penalties are of limited value if violations are not 
consistently prosecuted. New provisions also exhort the public to adopt 
more environmentally sustainable behaviors,256 consistent with previously 
non-enforceable exhortation in, for example, the Circular Economy Law.  
Nevertheless, other amendments address enforcement failures 
head-on. The new law specifies that local officials can be fired or demoted 
if they are found to have covered up environmental wrongdoing, falsified 
data, illegally withheld environmental data from the public, or failed to 
enforce legally required closure of violators.257 Similarly, those responsible 
for environmental impact assessment and supervision will now be held 
jointly liable for harm if they are found to have performed those duties 
fraudulently.258 These critical changes acknowledge that under-enforcement 
has been the Achilles Heel of Chinese environmental law to this point. 
They are designed to deter not only violations, but also the complicit 
bureaucrats that have regularly allowed violations to continue unpunished.  
If these enforcement incentives are themselves enforced (the big “if”), they 
have the potential to put some real bite into the Paper Tiger. 
The amendments also empower certain non-governmental 
organizations to bring public interest environmental litigation. 
Significantly, China’s official news organ openly reported that the 
government was specifically interested in expanding public interest 
litigation to channel public environmental anger away from mass protests 
and toward the more contained channels of legal process: “By promoting 
public interest litigation, it is hoped that the public's appeal for a better 
environment can be addressed through rule of law, instead of resorting to 
protests.”259 After much controversy, the new law permits government-
registered organizations in certain cities that have been operating for at 
least five years to bring these suits—a positive step forward from 
disallowing public interest standing to all, though falling short of calls by 
reformers to enable public interest standing to all environmental NGOs.260     
 Yet whether the primary motivation was to improve the Chinese 
environment or to avoid social unrest, we should consider this a hopeful 
sign. Efforts to shift environmental discontent toward legal channels must 
 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Xinhua Insight, Draft Law Ups Punishment for Environmental Wrongdoing, XINHUANET (April 21, 
2014), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-04/21/c_133279232.htm). 
260 See Sui-Lee Wee, China to Impose Tougher Penalties on Polluters Under New Law, REUTERS (April 
24, 2014), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/24/china-environment-
idUSL3N0NG35Q20140424). 
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be effectively coupled with the kinds of reforms suggested here to ensure 
that legal channels approximate the rule of law. But if they are, both the 
environment and the rule of law in China will benefit. The rule of law has 
always been a valuable societal tool for channeling public unrest away 
from more destructive means of expression and towards more productive 
mechanisms for social change. Peasants take up pitchforks when there is no 
other voice left to them—but genuine access to the courts could give 
effective voice to millions, sometimes many at a time. Hopefully, the 
amendments to the Chinese Environmental Protection law signify 
meaningful changes for China’s environmental and legal future. 
